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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper builds on earlier reputation models and investigates fund manager’s 
response when given an exogenous signal capital control signal by the Bank of 
Thailand (BOT). In so doing, this paper seeks to test out three hypotheses 1) the Wait-
and-see hypothesis 2) the Signaling Hypothesis, and 3) Separating Equilibrium. Using 
a novel fund-level dataset by the Emerging Portfolio Fund Research (EPFR)
1
 dating 
from 2003-2013 in six Emerging Asia countries; Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Indonesia, 
The Philippines, and Thailand and a higher frequency Capital Control Index (CCI), we 
find that a separating equilibrium outcome in portfolio investment patterns of mutual 
fund managers can result; skilled fund managers try to separate themselves from  
the pool by taking excessive risk through their portfolio choices. The finding shed 
lights on how macroeconomics policy results in idiosyncratic response of individual 
agents that can be used to assess potentially distortion to the overall welfare.  
 
                                                 
1
This dataset is by far the most comprehensive resource for portfolio investment data, used in several 
research works by the International Monetary Fund, European Central Bank, and academic institutions. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Capital Controls (CC) refer to actions taken by central banks to stabilize 
exchange rates, contain the influx of short term capital inflows, affecting interest rates 
by imposing restrictions on bank capital ratios, and accelerate or decelerate credit 
demand in domestic and international markets. A resulting change in these 
macroeconomic conditions following the implementation of the capital control 
policies can have a significant impact on the financial market as it directly affects both 
the return and volatility of different asset classes in bond and equity markets.  
However, capital control policies also send out signals to the financial markets 
(foreign and domestic) in addition to the previous traditional transmission mechanism.   
For example, it can signify a change in a country’s long-term attractiveness, as well as 
a change in the central bank’s stance towards foreign investors. For example, Forbes et 
al. (2012) finds that an increase in Brazil’s fixed income tax on foreign investors lead 
not only fixed income, but also equity investors to decrease their exposure to Brazil. In 
the same context, this paper attempts to highlight the importance the capital control 
signal in affecting the portfolio investment behavior of the mutual fund managers.  
The micro-level results regarding the portfolio choice of mutual fund managers can be  
used by future research to understand the potential distortions which may arise 
following an implementation of capital control policies.  
2 
 
1.1 Background 
1.1.1. Delegated Portfolio Management 
The mutual fund industry operates under the so-called Delegated Portfolio 
Management system (DPM), where households or investors allocate their capital to 
several fund managers, who then decide on how much to invest in a range of risk-free 
and risky assets. In return, fund managers derive his income in form of a fraction of 
total assets he manages. Asymmetric information arises as investors do not have 
perfect information on the quality of each fund manager, and this leads to a signaling 
game; each fund manager will try to build credible reputation through his investment 
choices in order to attract as much capital as possible given the asymmetric 
information. In this context, distortions can result when the choice that optimizes fund 
manager’s reputation differs from the one that would maximize returns from 
investment. This paper builds on earlier reputation models and investigates fund 
manager’s response when given an exogenous signal, which, in this case, is the capital 
control signal by the Bank of Thailand (BOT). 
In a signaling game, fund managers are usually classified to be either skilled or 
unskilled. Unskilled fund managers have the ability to extract meaningful information 
from any signal and then make an optimal portfolio allocation accordingly. On the 
contrary, unskilled fund managers do not possess such ability. They will therefore 
make less informative portfolio choices or try to mimic that of the skilled fund 
managers. Consequently, actions taken by other fund managers are also important in 
the signaling game. When information about fund manager’s ability is private, 
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unskilled managers have to conceal their inferior ability by trying to herd with the 
pool. Also, they can avoid responding to meaningful investment signals due to 
“sharing the blame” effect, where similar actions are easier to justify to investor.2  
 More recently, a number of papers find that skilled fund managers attempt to 
take extra risk in their portfolio choices to signal their quality.
3
 However, most 
existing models rest upon the assumption of perfect information regarding the fund’s 
ability, a rather rigid assumption and a sequential game structure. This paper therefore 
tries to test for the presence of a separating equilibrium in a more realistic setting, 
including a simultaneous game where market and investors learn about fund 
manager’s ability with a time lag.  
  
1.1.2 Effectiveness of Capital Control Policies 
It is hard to generalize capital control due to the various forms and purposes it 
is designed for. Capital control can be clustered by the flow type it targets
4
, or by the 
implementation means; controls may take the form of a price-based such as taxes, or 
quantity-based, as well as outright prohibitions.
5
 For example, the central bank might 
impose restrictions to foreign investors who would like to withdraw capital invested in 
less than a year in order to prevent speculation. In a recent study, Jongwanich and 
Kohpaiboon (2012) classify capital controls into administrative and market-based 
controls; the former is usually direct and quantity-based, while the latter is mostly 
                                                 
2
 For more detailed illustration, see Scharfstein and Stein (1990) 
3
See Huberman and Kandel (1994), Chevalier and Avery (1999), and Huddart (1999) 
4
See Magud and Reinhart (2006), Ostry et al. (2010), and Gallanger(2012) 
5
 See Neely 1999 and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) 
4 
 
indirect and price-based. For the purpose of distinguishing the effectiveness for  
a subset of control measures, this study will use the first categorization. 
In a comprehensive literature survey regarding capital control effectiveness, 
Magud and Reinhart (2006) have pointed out that as long as the impossible trinity
6
  is 
still at work, there is a role for the capital controls. In a more recent study, Stiglitz 
(2010) present a theoretical framework that justifies the role of capital control in 
circumstances where the benefits of international risk-sharing are outweighed by the 
costs of bankruptcy and contagion
7
. Even the IMF, a former advocate of capital 
market liberalization, has recently begun to advocate the use of Capital Flow 
Managements (CFMs). In the IMF’s Staff Discussion Note, Ostry et al. (2010) 
concludes that the use of capital controls on inflows is justified when policy adjustment 
is limited and has a long time-lag effect, and such controls can retain potency even 
though investors devise strategies to bypass them. 
Despite renewed theoretical interest the empirical evidence of capital control 
effectiveness is far from conclusive.
8
This is due mainly to a high degree of 
heterogeneity; control effectiveness in one country might not work in another country 
due to country-specific factors, the timing of measures implemented, and the types of 
capital controls
9
. Also, most of the papers employ binary variables to represent control 
                                                 
6
Most of the EMEs are small, open, and export-oriented, hence, under the Inflation Targeting regime; 
rising inflows can significantly complicate their policy conducts.
6
 These economies therefore need 
capital controls not only to insulate themselves from sudden booms and busts, but also to add more 
degree of freedom for their monetary policy toolkits. 
7
See Gallagher (2012) for a comprehensive theoretical survey 
8
 See Magud and Reinhart (2006) and Ostryet al. (2010)  
9
 SeeForbes et al. (2012), Magud et al (2011), and Magud and Reinhart (2006) 
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measures, which cannot capture the impact resulting from a change in the intensity of 
control.
10
 
Furthermore, “externality” effect from the capital controls becomes another 
highly interesting issue in the current globalization era that clearly warrants more attention. 
Kose et al. (2013) indicates that the importance of regional factors became more 
influential in explaining business cycles, especially in regions that experienced a sharp 
growth in intra-regional trade and financial flows. In this regard, the Asian region is 
no exception. Chantapacdepong (2012) also finds that the spillover effects of the 
CFMs measure exist among the East Asian Economies.  
Thailand is deemed one of the good case studies for three reasons. First, capital 
account regulation had changed markedly over the past decade;the 2003-2013 periods 
highlight variations in the use of both control; inflows and outflows. Also, this period 
featured the highly controversial measures: the Unremunerated Reserve Requirement 
(URR) in 2006
11
, which can potentially unravel the resulting externality effect that 
propagates within the region.  
 
1.1.3. Capital Account Policies in Thailand  
The capital account policies in Thailand during 2003-2013 have evolved from 
a focus on inflows restriction with outflow liberalization, focusing more on the latter 
                                                 
10
 See Jongwanich and Kohpaiboon (2012) regarding the construction and application of the capital 
control indexes. 
11
 The URR measure is one of the capital control policies used to prevent the country from a sudden 
capital flight. Issued by the central bank, URR sets the minimum percentage of foreign investor’s 
deposit that can be withdrawn. If the fund is withdrawn within less than a year, 30% of the deposits will 
be detained. This increases the cost of capital and discourages speculation. 
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while enhancing other aspects such as risk management and private sector’s financial 
literacy. The featured control measure introduced during this period is obviously the 
Unremunerated Reserve Requirement (URR) in 2006 on inflows, which receive a lot 
of criticism.  
During the pre-URR period, 2003-2006, Thailand experienced a surge in the 
capital inflows, especially in form of FDI and portfolio investment. Increased inflows 
carry with it increased Baht appreciation, and more importantly speculated 
appreciation. Heavy intervention in the foreign exchange market results in the Bank of 
Thailand’s (BOT) balance sheet loss, and increased a country’ asset-liability mismatch 
in the capital account, with assets being mainly dominated by BOT’s reserves.12 
Several issuances of the BOT bonds to sterilize domestic liquidity also further 
complicated the policy-making under the Inflation Targeting regime.
13
 Therefore, with 
increased public pressure
14
 and fear of baht speculation, BOT began to impose certain 
restrictions on inflows since 2003, but also began to liberalize controls on outflows, 
with the hope to achieve a more balanced capital flow position. Appendix A presents 
key measures taken by BOT during such period of dual mechanism of inflow 
restriction and outflow liberalization. 
In terms of the signaling effect, most measures implemented by BOT are not 
deemed aggressive by the market. For example, in 2003, after the BOT strongly urged 
financial institutions to refrain from several speculative transactions, evidence showed 
                                                 
12
 See IMF’s International Investment Position report, 2006 
13
 Sterilization by issuing BOT bonds affects the yield curve, which is associated to asset prices and 
policy rate. 
14
Media at that time also stressed on large loss on BOT balance sheet as representing ineffective 
management. 
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that investors triedto evade the rule; there had been a sudden increase in Non-Resident 
Baht Accounts (NRBA)
15
 from the normal level of 18 billion baht to 63 billion baht by 
October 2003
16
. Even right before the imposition of the URR, a rising number of Non 
Deliverable Forward (NDF) and NRBA were identified by the central bank 
authority.During this period, BOT began to issue several warnings against speculative 
transaction, but the situation did not change. 
As a result, as the Baht appreciation peaked in the last quarter of 2006, BOT 
decided to impose the URR measure on 18
th
 December 2006. It is a price-based, 
Chilean style restriction
17, with the goal to “(1) break the momentum of rapid one-way 
speculation on the baht and allow the baht movement to be more in line with regional 
currencies; (2) slow down the surge of inflows, which would enable the FX 
management to be more effective, especially during the period of ongoing concerns 
over the US dollar slide; and (3) provide time for the private sector to adjust to the 
sharp rise of the baht and for various measures implemented by the central bank aimed 
at stimulating domestic demand and achieving more balanced flows to bear fruit” 
(BOT Discussion paper 2009).  
The announcement of the URR led to panic in the financial markets. In the 
following day, the SET Index plunged from 730.55 at the end of 18 December 2006 to 
622.14. Both share prices and market capitalization all dropped dramatically, and 
trading had to be suspended during the day to stop investor panic. To regain market 
                                                 
15
 NRBA is the foreign investors’ deposits at domestic financial institutions in local Thai Baht currency. 
16
See BOT Discussion Paper 2009 
17
 Under the URR, all foreign transactions, excluding those pertaining to trade in goods and services, 
repatriation of investment abroad by residents, FDI, were required a 30% deposit of foreign exchange 
withthe BOT. If funds remained within Thailand for one year or more, such deposit is fully refunded.  If 
funds repatriated before a year, only two-thirds of the amount was refunded. 
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confidence, BOT clarified that ten categories of capital inflows were exempted from 
the URR.
18
 Even though the market rebounded significantly after the announcement, 
the SET did not surpass its pre URR level until May 2007. 
The post-URR period has been characterized by gradual lift of measures 
indicated in the URR, and the URR was eventually fully lifted in 2008. Meanwhile, 
key events include the enactment of the BOT Act in 2008, which gives BOT greater 
flexibility in managing assets. With reduced pressure and more arrays of tools for 
stability management, BOT focus’s more towards outflow liberalization measures. 
This includes the widening of assets available and an increased ceiling for domestic 
investors.  
 
1.2 Objectives 
This paper aims to show that a separating equilibrium can exist in DPM 
signaling game. In addition, we also explore the spill-over impact of capital control 
policies to other neighboring countries, thereby contributing to the little research 
directly exploring the externality effect of capital control policies at the micro level. 
We build on earlier reputation model by Huddart (1999) and employ a novel fund-
level dataset by the Emerging Portfolio Fund Research (EPFR)
19
 dating from 2003-
2013 in six Emerging Asia countries; Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Indonesia,  
                                                 
18
 With the most relevant being portfolio investment inflows for companies listed in SET and MAI, 
FDI, foreign currency borrowings transacted prior to 19 December 2006, and foreign currencies bought 
or exchanged against baht of to less than $20,000 or equivalent. See BOT’s Notice regarding the Rules 
and Practice on Currency Exchange, December 18, 2006 for full detail. 
 
19
This dataset is by far the most comprehensive resource for portfolio investment data, used in several 
research works by the International Monetary Fund, European Central Bank, and academic institutions. 
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the Philippines, and Thailand. Also, we construct a higher frequency capital control 
indexes by flow types in order to further differentiate the resulting potency of control 
measures. 
 Highlights from the paper include the introduction of the endogenous fund 
manager skill, which allows for a dynamic evolution of fund manager’s quality.  
A naïve fund manager entering the market can later become a skilled one in this 
portfolio investment game. Also, we posit the heterogeneous beliefs and lagged 
responses of fund managers. All these underlying condition renders our model more 
realistic to the current financial setting while testing out the main theoretical 
framework of signaling game.
20
 The result will unify what has previously deemed to 
be mutually exclusive and provides insights to the micro-level interaction in the 
international portfolio investment market. 
 
1.3 Organization of The Thesis 
The remaining sections are organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents  
a literature review regarding the capital control policies, signaling hypothesis, and 
delegated portfolio management. Chapter 3 gives an overview of the theoretical model 
framework and modification from previous model. Chapter 4 discusses the dataset and 
methodology used in the study. Chapter 5 presents the result and limitations, and 
Chapter 6 concludes. 
                                                 
20
The concept was first introduced by Spence (1974), known as Spence Signaling Game. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1 Capital Control Policies 
 
Over the past few years, controls on inflows have gained a significant support, 
both theoretically, empirically, and in practice, by implementations of several 
Emerging Market Economies (EMEs).
21
 Magud and Reinhart (2006) attempted to 
perform a meta-analysis on the effectiveness of capital controls on inflows and 
outflows by standardization of previous empirical findings.
22
His conclusion justifies 
the role of controls on inflows in increasing monetary policy independence, changing 
the composition of flows, and mitigating exchange rate volatility.  
However, the results at the country level are still far from conclusive, varying 
according to countries and periods sampled. For Thailand in particular, Edison and 
Reinhart (2001) did not find any significant role of capital controls implemented in 
1997. On the contrary, Coelho and Gallagher (2010) found that capital controls 
introduced in the 2000s were relatively effective in reducing overall volume of 
Thailand’s capital inflows. Using data from 1993 to 2010 and the constructed capital 
                                                 
21
Thailand, Taiwan, Brazil, and Korea are some of the example 
22
In the study, two indexes of controls are constructed to standardize all empirical findings: an index of 
Capital Controls Effectiveness and an index of Weighted Capital Control Effectiveness. The weight 
attached to the latter accounts for the degree of methodological rigor of each study in the sample. 
11 
 
control indexes, Jongwanich and Kohpaiboon (2012) found that Thailand’s capital 
control policies can actually alter the composition of the flows.
23
 
Regarding externality effect from capital controls or what several economists 
call “the new welfare economics of capital controls,”24empirical results are quite 
supportive. Korinek (2012), using a general equilibrium model, found that the welfare 
or externality effect exists in the world economy; capital controls or reserve 
accumulation in one country has significant international spillover effects by pushing 
down the global interest rates and resulting in stronger flows to other countries. 
Likewise, Forbes et al. (2012) found that Brazil’s taxes on capital inflows had  
a significant externality effect; an increase in Brazil’s taxes on inflows lead investors 
to decrease their portfolio allocations to Brazil in both bonds and equities, and 
simultaneously increase allocations to other countries having substantial exposure to 
China while also allocating their shares away from countries viewed as more likely to 
implement capital controls.  
 
2.2 Signaling Hypothesis 
The literature on signaling theories of capital control policies are mixed. Gelos 
(2011) and Broner et al. (2006) points to heterogeneous beliefs of fund managers.  
In interpreting the same signal, fund manager’s preference, experience, and ability can 
also result in different response in terms of weight changes. Bartolini and Drazen 
(1997) develops a comprehensive model of capital control in a two period game and 
                                                 
23
 They find that the composition actually tilted towards a long-term flows i.e. FDI. 
24
Refer to the spill-over impact of capital control policies on other countries apart from the one that 
initiate the control. More detailed theoretical survey in Gallanger 2012 
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concludes that imposition of capital control in period one signals the higher 
probability of the control being implemented in period two. Hence, capital control is 
viewed as a negative signal for fund managers.  
contrary contrast, Forbes et al. (2012) conduct a comprehensive survey among 
institutional investors and finds that imposition of controls can also imply a good 
signal if it increases long-term attractiveness, especially in a country where the central 
bank is perceived as credible. Moreover, capital controls imposed in one country can 
also lead fund managers to revise their expectation about the likelihood of capital 
controls being imposed in another country, implying the bubble-thy-neighbor effect in 
portfolio investment. Therefore, if the mixed support for signaling theories and the 
heterogeneous beliefs hold true, we should expect to see mixed coefficient signs in the 
coefficient of capital control variables.  
 
2.3 Delegated Portfolio Management: Principal-Agent Problem 
 The DPM literature has developed into two strands. The first one focuses on  
the importance of the moral hazard problem within the principal-agent relationship, 
which is distinguished from that of traditional principal-agent problems
25
. Meanwhile, 
the second strand emphasizes the adverse selection problem and the signaling game, 
with fund managers as the players possessing different types of ability. Here, the 
question is not whether effort is exerted, but rather the action performed by different 
types. This paper is to explore further the second strand, with the aim to shed more 
                                                 
25
 In DPM context, the agent can control both return and volatility of the outcome, unlike in the 
traditional setting. 
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light on the behavior of fund managers’ portfolio allocation following an exogenous 
signal, which, in this case, is the capital control policy issued by a country. 
 
2.3.1 Adverse Selection and the Reputation Effect 
Empirical work regarding the model with reputation or career concern effect 
often points in a pooling equilibrium outcome. Most of the herding literature rests 
upon an assumption of imperfect information about fund manager’s type and is based 
on a sequential game.
26
 However, in the current competitive financial market 
environment, it is reasonable to assume that the market has the mechanism, through 
time, to correctly learn the type of the agent
27
. For example, real-time access to data 
allows investor to closely track performances of fund managers. Holmstom (2012) 
also suggests that a wider range of investable assets and tools such as short-selling and 
leverage can further facilitate the differentiation of skilled fund managers from the 
pool through more sophisticated investing
28
. This is consistent with the finding of 
Koch 2012, who concludes that herd managers are the ones who underperform
29
. 
Hence, separations are usually tied to superiority in skills
30
.  
There is a relatively small literature documenting a separating equilibrium 
outcome given the reputational effects among fund managers. Among others, 
Chevalier and Avery (1999) develop a more general model based on that of 
                                                 
26
See Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Graham (1999), Banerjee (1992), Admati and Pfleider (1997), and 
Stoughton (1993). 
27
This is also documented in Huberman and Kandel (1993) and Chevalier and Avery (1999). 
28
 Since their portfolio choice is more difficult to be mimicked by the unskilled fund managers. Also, it 
is hard to maintain good returns on highly unpredictable assets using financial tools such as interest rate 
derivatives. 
29
 Herd managers are fund managers who copy the action of other fund managers regardless of the 
signal. 
30
See also Prendergast and Stole (1996) 
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Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and introduce, for the first time, a more dynamic concept 
of skills. By incorporating the probability that a proportion of managers have 
meaningful information about their type, they find that signaling or contrarian 
equilibrium will replace the herding outcome once a fund manager accumulates 
sufficient private type information.
31
 With the intention to build reputation, a skilled 
fund manager will therefore opt for a contrarian strategy and go against the market. 
Moreover, an unskilled manager will also find it optimal to anti-herd to conceal their 
inferiority.
32
 The results suggest that young fund managers are likely to herd early and 
then deviate from the pool later in their career.  
A separating outcome is also documented in Huberman and Kandel (1993). 
They show that a unique Riley Equilibrium that survives the Intuitive Criterion is 
achievable in their signaling model, where fund managers engage in excessive risk-
taking to distinguish themselves from the pool. The highlight of the model is the 
introduction of the manager’s skill as a Markov process, where previous period 
realization is highly correlated with the current one. They also assume that the market 
correctly learns about the type of fund managers with a two-period lag. The setting 
allows the model to be more sufficiently general that a pooling equilibrium outcome 
that may also arise under certain circumstances.
33
 This is also consistent with the 
finding of Prendergast and Stole (1996), who concludes that agents will make 
investment choices that diverge from that of the group to signal the market that they 
possess meaningful information.  
                                                 
31
Pooling or herding outcome is the result documented in the model of Scharfstein and Stein (1990). 
32
See more detailed illustration in Chevalier and Avery (1999) 
33
In their model, pooling can survive the Intuitive Criterion when the manager has low 
precision information. 
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Among all research work in support of separating outcome, the model by 
Huddart (1999) is one of the most realistic settings. The model depicts a repeatable 
two-period simultaneous game, which is more realistic with a real-world market 
trading environment. Huddart (1999) employs the concept used by Huberman and 
Kandel (1994) by assuming perfect information about fund manager’s type. This 
allows portfolio choice to be a signaling tool and reputation and fee represents the key 
underlying factors causing distortion. He concludes that the performance-based fee, 
precision of information, and most importantly high degree of risk aversion can 
sustain a separating equilibrium outcome. The inclusion of the risk aversion role and 
the simultaneous game setting are more realistic and not seen in many general models 
such as Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Chevalier and Avery (1999), Heinkel and 
Stoughton (1994) and Wang (2003). 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
 
3.1 The Modified Model 
 
This paper seeks to understand the distortions of fund manager’s portfolio 
allocation behavior in the presence of reputation concern, given an exogenous signal 
from the capital control policies issued by the Bank of Thailand. We develop a 
theoretical two-period model based on that of Huddart (1999) and Wang (2003). In 
Huddart (1999), he finds that high degree of risk aversion and precision of  
the information extracted from the signal, as well as the certain threshold of fees 
imposed by fund managers all favor a separating equilibrium outcome where the 
informed fund manager engage in excessive risk-taking to differentiate themselves 
from the pool whereas the uninformed fund managers allocate all of the capital in the 
market portfolio. 
Our paper adopted the concept of dynamic skill from Avery and Chevalier. 
However, the difference is that original model from Scharfstein and Stein (1990) 
assumes homogenous beliefs, smart managers tend to receive same truth, which favors 
“sharing the blame effect.” Our model relaxes those assumptions, we allow for 
heterogeneous beliefs which can be due to several factors such as fund’s style, biases, 
mandate, as well as institutional barrier. Although the concept developed in Chevalier 
and Avery (1999) is dynamic, the model framework has two main aspects that are not 
 17 
realistic. First, it is a sequential game where one manager move first whereas in reality 
most investment decision must be made instantaneously. Second, the model excludes 
the role of risk aversion whereas recent literature clearly supports the importance of 
risk aversion in financial decision-making.  
To be more realistic, we adopt model setting of Huddart (1999), but transform 
the variable q in Huddart (1999) from a quantitative probability to a behavioral 
variable capturing endogenous fund manager’ skill to be dynamic and achieve a 
separating equilibrium as a special case under the Huddart (1999) model. We support 
assumption cited by Huddart that both market and fund managers will learn 
information over time. This is documented in many papers as well. But we relax it in 
the sense that the investor and market will correctly update their belief regarding fund 
manager’s ability after the end of period one, hence with a lag34. Also, we apply  
the same assumption that the market use optimal contract that enables both types to 
engage and not shirk, hence excluding the moral hazard problem. Therefore, the main 
distortions come from career concern of fund managers. Their decision will be 
governed by 1) the adverse selection setting and 2) how they actually interpret the 
signal (Signaling Hypothesis). 
This paper’s objective is to test whether a separating equilibrium can sustain 
given the asymmetric information between investors and fund managers. In order to 
arrive at the separating equilibrium outcome, we extend Huddart (1999) model in four 
ways. First, we posit that there is a time lag period prior to the initiation of the game. 
Such wait-and-see strategy adopted by fund managers is well documented in several 
                                                 
34
The lag assumption is also documented in Huberman and Kandel (1994). 
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papers, including Forbes et al (2012). Secondly, we incorporate the signaling 
hypothesis into the model, which means fund manager’s respond to any exogenous 
signals vary according to each fund manager’s heterogeneous beliefs and fund-specific 
characters. Thirdly, we assume endogenous fund manager’s skill, namely, fund 
managers who start off as bad manager can, over time, actually become a good fund 
manager once he has accumulated more experience. Lastly, we assume relative risk-
aversion, which sustains only separating equilibrium outcome. Hence, this can be 
deemed as a special case to that of Huddart (1999). This paper extends Huddart’s 
model in four ways as followed: 
 
3.1.1 Wait-and-see Hypothesis 
 The first extension we make to the Huddart (1999) model is the incorporation 
of a lagged response before the two-period game initiates. The process, fund’s 
mandate, and heterogeneous beliefs of fund managers’ can potentially lead fund 
managers to engage in the wait-and-see strategy following the announcement of the 
capital control policies. Empirically, this lagged response among portfolio managers 
are well documented in several literatures
35
. Forbes et al. (2012) finds that most equity 
fund managers already have the information or signal and have priced them in their 
portfolio decision
36
.  
Furthermore, in our sample, all funds are emerging equity funds, with  
a mandate to generate long-term returns. Hence, each reallocation of the portfolio 
                                                 
35
 See Forbes et al. 2012, Ghosh et al. (2011), and Warnock (2011) 
36
EU 2014 survey also confirms that fund managers will only response to the difference between the 
priced-in information and actual policy conduct. 
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weight will have to reflect a fundamental shift in the long-term path. Once the current 
policy announcement is considered a surprise to the market, either in terms of a 
meaningful shift of policy stance in the future or the country’s attractiveness as a 
whole, fund managers will have to initiate the reassessment process, which is time-
consuming. Lastly, heterogeneous beliefs of fund managers in terms of signaling 
hypothesis also implies first-mover disadvantage. Hence, given that fund managers are 
risk-averse with career concern, they will rationally resort to a wait-and-see strategy. 
 
3.1.2 Signaling hypothesis 
Recent macroeconomic policy conduct employs communication channels as a 
new and powerful way to influence the financial market as part of the transmission 
mechanism. In this regard, the announcement of the capital control policies to be 
implemented in a country can have a substantial impact on the financial market. Since 
the capital control policies in the paper are initiated from the Bank of Thailand, we 
explore the behavioral pattern of fund managers among selected Asian countries. The 
signaling hypothesis posits that the respond of fund manager’ following the capital 
control signal vary and can go both ways. Gelos (2011) and Broner et al. (2006) points 
to heterogeneous beliefs of fund managers. In interpreting the same signal, fund 
manager’s preference, experience, and ability result in different response in terms of 
weight changes. Empirical evidence also supports the mixed response of fund 
managers
37
. Therefore, if the mixed support for signaling theories and the 
                                                 
37
See Forbes et al. (2012), Bartolini and Drazen (1997), Gelos (2011), and Broner et al. (2006) 
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heterogeneous beliefs are valid, we should expect to see mixed signs in the coefficient 
of capital control variables. 
 
3.1.3 The Endogenous Skill (Variable q) 
The key difference is that towards the end of period one, Huddart (1999) 
excludes the possibility that after updating their beliefs, investors will end up with one 
fund, by having q as a probability that a proportion of the uninformed type will imitate 
the informed portfolio’s composition. Here, our paper posits that we arrive at the same 
conclusion, not by having q as the random chance that uninformed fund managers will 
mimic the informed fund managers, but the random chance that a proportion of bad 
type will become a good/informed type in the next period. Consequently, as long as q 
is positive, rational risk-averse investors can still assign non-zero weight to the 
uninformed player. Hence, the game becomes a repeated game without a change in 
defined equilibrium outcome from Huddart (1999). Even though there is no change in 
the mathematical representation, the underlying mechanism differs substantially. 
Therefore, the re-interpretation of the q parameter as an endogenous skill accumulated 
overtime is the highlight of our model. The q parameter is transformed from a random 
probability in Huddart (1999) model to a behavioral variable capturing the dynamic 
nature of fund managers. This is a more realistic assumption in the real world market 
mechanism. Coupled with relative risk-aversion assumption (α > 0.5), this will sustain 
the separating equilibrium outcome in the first period, which will be illustrated in the 
following section. The same setting then repeats again in the next period as the pool of 
fund managers develop over time. 
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3.1.4 Separating Equilibrium  
We assume relative risk-averse (α < 0.5 after normalized to 1), which sustains 
the separating equilibrium. Such a value is consistent with several empirical 
papers.
38
Moreover, development of new and sophisticated financial tools including 
short selling and leverage in trading also makes decisions by the good type more 
difficult to be mimicked; this strategy is well documented in Holmstrom’s (2012) 
paper. 
In Huddart’s model, conditions supporting a pooling equilibrium have to 
enable the bad type fund managers to mimic the portfolio choice of the good type fund 
managers. His proposition 1 reveals that the bad type must be relative risk-loving in 
order to deem the gain from mimicking the aggressive portfolio of the good type more 
than offset the potential loss in fund flow at the end of period two. Therefore, the risk 
aversion assumption prevents them from mimicking the good type, excluding  
the pooling equilibrium outcome. In addition, although the bad type whose risk-
aversion degree is not high, the advent of financially-innovative techniques, including 
leveraging, short-selling, various forms of derivatives, make the aggressive portfolio 
choice of good type fund managers more difficult to imitate. This is supported by 
Holmstrom (2012), who finds that short-selling and leveraging greatly improve the 
chance of a good type to stay differentiated in the market. Matsusaka (2011) also finds 
that performance-based compensation and the sufficiently more skilled of the good 
type result in a separating equilibrium outcome. Likewise, Wang 2003 concludes that 
precision of information, proportion of good versus bad type, as well as risk aversion 
                                                 
38
 See EU 2014 survey of portfolio managers, Huddart (1999), and Heinkel and Stoughton (1994) 
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of fund managers all contributes to the separating equilibrium outcome. In all, we have 
excluded the possibility that the bad type can and will mimic the good type in line 
with several literatures, which makes our hypothesis a special case of that of Huddart. 
In this regard, the signaling hypothesis is one of the subset of the separating 
equilibrium outcome, which represents a different pattern of investing in order to 
differentiate oneself from the pool. 
 
3.2 The Model Setting 
3.2.1 Assumption 
We adopt the same key assumptions as in Huddart (1999) and Heinkel and 
Stoughton (1994), which assumes a perfect competition, where all fund managers act 
as price takers, move simultaneously when deciding their portfolio choices, with no 
possibility of collusion. Both fund managers and investors are risk-averse. There are 
two types of fund managers, good and bad, and the precision of information obtained 
from exogenous signal depend on fund manager’s ability. Every fund manager has 
perfect information about his or her ability. In addition, although investor doesn’t 
know the fund manager’s type in period 1, they correctly learn, or update their belief, 
about the type of the fund managers over time (In this case, in period two) (Unlike 
Wang, asymmetric information setting dissolve after period one, as both parties 
correctly learn about the type in period 2.) Next, the fees paid to fund managers are 
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exogenous, and is defined as a constant fraction of the asset under management.
39
Also, 
Performance-based fee or the like contract is a sufficient screening mechanism to 
enforce managers to put forth effort and reveal their type. As the fund managers will 
only get more wealth to manage for the next period only if they are perceived to be a 
smart one, there is an effect of reputation, which leads to distortions in portfolio 
choices chosen by each fund manager. Hence, career concerns or the possibility of 
being withdrawn from the fund at the end of the first period, not the moral hazard 
problem, is what drives the distortions in the model.  
Apart from the abovementioned assumptions laid out in Huddart (1999), this 
paper further assumes that 1) the skill is time-varying, meaning a bad type can become 
a good type as they gain more experienced over time. 2) There is a time lag as 
managers engage in wait-and-see due to heterogeneous beliefs from the signaling 
hypothesis. Also, institutional barrier and fund’s own style can result in different lag 
structure between each fund. And lastly, 3) we modify the assumption regarding the 
risk aversion of fund managers and investors to be more realistic in the sense that they 
are relatively risk-averse.
40
The inter-linkages between the signaling hypothesis and 
risk-averse-driven model results in a separating equilibrium condition, which will be 
illustrated in more detail in the following section. 
Different assumptions underlying fund manager’s ability can often lead to 
different outcomes. In Huddart (1999), perfect information results in the possibility of 
both a pooling, where bad managers tries to mimic the portfolio choice of a good 
                                                 
39
 Under contract theory papers, this type of fee is optimal and can eliminate most of the moral hazard 
problems, although the setting of assumptions underlying Chevalier 1999 are different 
40
 Implying a coefficient of risk aversion α>0.5 
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managers, or a separating equilibrium, where good managers are able to separate or 
differentiate themselves from the pool. On the contrary, imperfect information 
assumed by Wang (2003) leads to a pooling equilibrium outcome as a main result, 
with the possibility of a separating equilibrium where the precision of information and 
the proportion of good type managers enter the market. Also, another key difference 
are the factors used as screening mechanisms by investors. In Huddart (1999), 
portfolio choice can be used directly to gauge the ability of fun managers, and when 
weights differ for each type of manager, this reveal the true quality or type of a fund 
manager to investors. However, in Wang (2003), imperfect information requires 
investor to use fund performance as screening mechanism. Signal and outcome are 
assumed to be independent from each other. 
 
3.2.2 The Setting  
The main setting is the same as Huddart (1999).  There are many small 
investors and fund managers, participating in a two-period game. There is an 
interaction between an investor who has to allocate his wealth to two fund managers, 
and the fund manager’s investment strategies and effort used to influence investor’s 
perception of his ability. There exists two types of investible assets, risky asset A, and 
riskless asset M. M is the market portfolio with no systematic risk. The risky asset 
pays either 2 or 0 with equal likelihood while the riskless asset pays the same amount 
invested. Both investors and fund managers have constant relative risk aversion utility 
functions for wealth as shown in equation 1. This assumption ensures that once given 
the same access to market information, investor’s choice will be identical to that of 
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fund managers. All parties’ objective is to maximize their expected utilities at the end 
of the two periods. This paper focuses on the relative risk-averse case which leads to a 
separating equilibrium outcome
41
. Next, there is no cost to the fund managers to obtain 
the information from the signal,
42
 hence the model distortion is driven by career 
concerns, and the moral hazard distortion is excluded
43
. In addition, initial wealth has 
no effect on all parties’ behavior and hence it is normalized to be 1.0 at the beginning 
of the period.
44
 No intermediate consumption is assumed. 
a.  Investor 
Investors are constrained to investing all endowments in one of the two funds. 
They know for sure that one of the fund managers is uninformed or unskilled. Initially, 
the investor’s wealth is assumed to be 1.0 and his prior belief regarding a fund 
manager’s ability is that there is an equal chance that any can be a good type. 
However, at the end of the period one, investors will observe three things 1) portfolio 
weight chosen by the two fund managers and 2) performance of the two funds. The set 
of feasible actions by investor is to either do nothing, let the same proportion of his 
wealth be managed equally by both fund managers, or he can reallocate his wealth, 
switching away from one manager to the others. Given available information at  
the end of period one, investor’s best response is to place the fund with the fund 
manager who performs best in the first period. Since a good type manager has better 
knowledge and skills, they will resort to sophisticated investment allocation by 
                                                 
41
This is in contrast to Wang (2003) who assumes investor’s prior and posterior beliefs are different.  
42
 This is true under the context of the capital control policies by the BOT since all data are accessible, 
sufficient for the good type to correctly extract meaningful information from the signal. 
43
This is also consistent with many papers including Wang (2003), Heinel and Stoughton 1994), 
44
The irrelevance of initial wealth assumption is also employed in Wang (2003) paper. 
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assuming more risk and getting higher return by placing a positive weight in the risky 
asset A. Hence, Huddart (1999) assumes away irrelevant off-equilibrium cases by 
assuming that once investor observes that the w, or the weight placed on risky assets is 
zero, investors will immediately deem that fund manger as uninformed or unskilled or 
the bad type. This paper follows this assumption, and it is consistent with the 
additional contribution of the relative risk-averse. In general, risk averse agent are 
likely to place all of the capital in the market portfolio, given he knows that at the time 
he is the unskilled one and obtain only random noise from the exogenous signal of 
capital control. 
Beginning with 1 in initial wealth, the investor’s aim is to maximize his return 
from investment in the two funds. Let rho be the proportion of the wealth that investor 
places in fund manager I where I is the set of (uninformed (U), and informed (I) fund 
managers).  
In the first period,   is fixed at ½. By the end of the period 1, investor receives 
either (1 ) Utf R  or (1 ) Itf R  per one dollar that he invested. His wealth defined 
by  , therefore becomes: 
1 11 1I UI UR R   
  
 
 Investor’s objective is to maximize his expected utility in the two periods, 
hence maximizing the return per one dollar he invested in any fund manager, 
assuming he began by equally allocation to both fund at the beginning of period 1. 
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b. Fund managers 
There are two types of risk-averse fund managers, the good one is informed 
(type I) since they can have access to meaningful signal regarding risky asset A’s 
return. The good type will receive a meaningful signal from the exogenous capital 
control policies or in this case they have the ability to interpret the signal while the bad 
type cannot. The bad type of uninformed agent cannot either obtain or interpret the 
signal (type U) hence it is of no use to them. Hence, the uninformed fund manager will 
always invest in the market portfolio M in the absence of reputational effect. As the 
fund managers derives income from fee, f which is a subset of (0,1) as percentage of 
total asset under management, the uninformed managers will have the incentive to 
mimic the strategy of the informed fund manager since if they do not invest in the 
portfolio weight at all, investor will be able to gain meaningful information regarding 
their type from the different action, hence reputation concern leads the uninformed to 
mimic the informed or the good type by randomly choosing either  or 

. 
Meanwhile, given investor’s belief, reputation concern also lead the informed fund 
managers to try to differentiate themselves from the pool in order to reap most of  
the asset under management at the end of period one. In the Equilibrium section,  
Our paper contributes by introducing the “endogenous skill”, here the 
parameter q is transformed from a probability that uninformed will choose positive 
weight on risky asset in the hope to appear informed, into the probability that the fund 
himself actually become a good type over time as he become more experienced. This 
assumption is more realistic and the dynamic evolution while still resulting in the 
same equilibrium calculation as in Huddart (1999). Given that all parties are relatively 
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risk averse, represented by   > 0.5.we will show that given relative risk-aversion and 
endogenous skill. This will result in the separating equilibrium where the uninformed 
fund manager finds that it is not worthwhile to mimic and the informed are able to 
differentiate themselves in period one, leading to a separating equilibrium outcome. 
The fund managers’ objective is to maximize his expected utility, which comes 
from maximizing his revenue. Fund manager’s revenue is the product of fee, 
proportion of total wealth invested in each fund manager, total asset under 
management, and the return on funds. In period one each of the fund manager has 
wealth = 0.5 to manage whereas in period 2 each has asset (1 )f   to manage. His 
expected utility is therefore the sum of 1) the fee earned in period one and 2) the return 
he earns on that fee income over the one period .Hence, he maximizes: 
 
 
c. Signal 
We assume the meaningful capital control signal perceived by skilled fund 
managers can be either good (G) or bad (B). In addition, the payoff structure of the 
risky asset A is assumed to be the same as that in Huddart (1999), where risky asset 
can either pay 2 or 0. Let p be the probability that the risky asset A will pay 2.  The 
good signal (G) is the one that will cause the skilled fund managers to revise their 
belief of p to be 0.5 < p < 1, hence they will increase their portfolio weight   
allocated to the risky asset A, and vice versa. The contrary applies for bad signal (B). 
 
      
1 2 2 2 11 2 1 2( (1 ) ) ( ( (1 ) ))i i i i ii i i iEU f R R f f R EU f R R f         
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3.2.3 The Timing 
Unlike Huddart (1999), Heinkel and Stoughton (1994), and Wang (2003), we 
incorporate a time lag before the game begins, and there is no fixed lag structure for 
each fund manager.
45
 Initially, there is an equal proportion of small investors investing 
in both funds. Then, before the portfolio weight decisions are made in period 1, good 
fund managers receive exogenous signal, with equal probability to be bad or good. 
Upon receiving the signal, good type then revise their beliefs regarding  
the payoff of the assets, upward with p > 0.5 if signal is good and downward 
otherwise. In the mean time, uninformed or the bad type receive no meaningful signal. 
Then after returns are realized, investors then learn about type of fund managers and 
decide to reallocate their funds for period 2. Fund managers also get paid in the form 
of a percentage of total asset under management. Hence, for their next period payoff, 
all fund managers are concerned about their reputation, in other words, the perception 
of investors towards their ability. We assume here that all type want to maximize their 
utility function. Table 1 shows overall sequence of the game. 
The key difference is that towards the end of period one, Huddart (1999) 
excludes the possibility that after updating their beliefs, investors will end up with one 
fund, by having q as a probability that fund will imitate. Here, our paper posits that we 
arrive at the same conclusion, not by having q, but by the fact that q here represents 
not the random chance that fund will mimic, but the random chance that a proportion 
of bad type will actually become  good type in the next period. Therefore, even though 
                                                 
45
 This can be due to fund style, fund managers’ own factor, and institutional barrier, also see Forbes et 
al 2012 
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Skilled fund manager
receives signal 
and invests
receives 
signal 
and invests
Unskilled fund manager invests invests
Investors
reallocate 
investment 
Time
return realized return realized
Period 1 Period 2
there is no change in the mathematical representation, the underlying mechanism 
differs substantially. Coupled with risk-aversion α > 0.5, this will sustain the 
separating equilibrium outcome, which will be illustrated in the following section. 
And then same setting repeat again in the next period. 
Table 1: Timing of the Game 
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Figure 1: Payoffs and The Belief Updating Functions 
 
Utility function for wealth (both fund managers and investors) 
U(W) = W
α/α      α < 1   (1) 
Assets:                         2 with probability 1/2 
   Risky asset A, with payoff  
2 Assets              0 with probability 1/2 
  Riskless asset M, with zero return (return the same amount) 
Signals: regarding payoffs of risky asset A 
Let p be the probability that risky asset A will pays 2.        
                  A pays 2 with probability p 
        G         Revise upward;  
Good type                  A pays 0 with probability 1- p 
                                              A pays 2 with probability 1- p 
     B         Revise downward; 
                      A pays 0 with probability p 
                                        A pays 2 with probability 1/2 
Bad type  
                                              
                A pays 0 with probability 1/2 
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3.2.4. Equilibrium 
 A separating equilibrium outcome
46
is achieved given reputation concern and 
relative risk-aversion of fund managers and investor. The first-best optimum without 
reputation-induced distortion can be obtained under the case of single period game or 
under performance-based fee contract. Since this paper excludes the issue of contract 
theory, we seek to demonstrate the separating outcome whereby reputation concern 
causes the good type fund manager to engage in excessive risk-taking in period one by 
over investing in the risky asset A.  
 To show this, two conditions must be satisfied. First, each type of fund 
manager must not find any other deviation more appealing than the equilibrium 
outcome. Hence, there is no possible deviation. Second, the investor’s belief must not 
be objected by the intuitive criterion
47
.  
a. Single period equilibrium  
Since the introduction of the endogenous skill and time lag before  
the beginning of the game doesn’t result in a change in the overall calculation as that 
of Huddart (1999), we arrive at the same conclusion for the equilibrium in period one 
where the first-best optimum is attained. With the one-period time frame and the fee as 
a percentage of total wealth managed by each fund manager, this will result in the first 
best separating equilibrium outcome. The bad type fund manager will put all of his 
portfolio weight in the market portfolio M whereas the good type will choose portfolio 
weight w that maximizes the expected utility 
                                                 
46
We follow the same methodology in arriving at the special separating case as depicted by Huddart 
(1999) where  > 0.5. 
47
 The intuitive criterion rules out unrealistic off-equilibrium outcome 
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First Order Condition:  
where  
Hence, good type will choose w following good signal (G) and w following bad signal (B). 
b. Two-period game equilibrium 
For a two-period setting, we now arrive at the equilibrium by solving for the 
Baynes Nash Subgame Perfect quilibrium through backward induction method 
a. Optimal investment outcome in period 2  
In period 2, types in period 1 are revealed. Hence, here there is no incentive to 
both parties. Uninformed will always invest weight   = 0 and go fully with market 
portfolio. The informed chooses G  upon receiving good signal, and B  upon 
receiving bad signal. 
 As portfolio weight will reveal type, in the next period, investors will decide 
whether to invest in bad type depending on their perceived value of q, or the 
endogenous reputation or skill. If q > 0.5, they will still have a positive weight in both 
funds, but if they perceive q < 0.5, here the current bad type will be either replaced by 
having investors investing all their wealth in the current good type, or choosing a new 
fund in the pooling whose performance and portfolio weight resembles that of the 
good type. Remark1: the fact that bad type might become more experienced in the 
next game makes investor retain a positive weight despite the fact that they are bad in 
period 1 of game 1. 
 
( (1 ) ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )EU A M pU p U         
* ( 1)
( 1)
H
H




1
1
(1 )
p
H
p
 
   
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b. Optimal investment outcome in period 1  
As the intuitive criterion is constraint such that upon seeing the weight   = 0, 
investor will consider the particular fund manager as uninformed or the bad type, By 
backward induction, as market correctly learns about their type in period 2, best response in 
period one is to differentiate themselves as soon as possible. Next question is whether it 
is feasible. Proposition 2 shows conditions that determine a separating equilibrium. 
 Huddart (1999) shows that once all agents are relative risk-averse ( α < 0.5), 
there does not exist a sequential equilibrium that meets the Intuitive Criterion where 
both types of fund managers choose portfolio w with positive probability. This is 
shown by contradiction.
48
 Hence, the bad type decide not to mimic by choosing   = 0 
for certain in equilibrium. If the good type does not think there is a threat from 
mimicking, he will choose the   equal to the first best. However, since there is 
reputation concern, the good type will invest more aggressively and go for   = 

  
upon receiving good signal G or   = 

, which is sufficiently risky to discourage the 
unsophisticated bad type to imitate his strategies
49
.  
Proposition 2: Only separating equilibrium exists when  and 
Upon receiving signal G and B, the good type fund manager will choose 

  and 
 
 
 as portfolio weight for the risky asset, respectively. This is sufficient to 
discourage mimicking from the bad type
50
. 
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 More detailed mathematical proof can be found in the appendix. 
49
 This leads to inequality 2 in the appendix. 
50
 As the bad type will be indifferent between two choices. More detailed mathematical proof can be 
found in the Appendix. 
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Testable Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 1: If wait-and-see hypothesis due to heterogeneous beliefs of fund manager is 
true, should see a lagged response following capital control.  
Hypothesis 2: if signaling hypothesis due to heterogeneous beliefs of fund manager is true, 
we should see a mixed coefficient sign of capital control.  
Hypothesis 3: If a separating equilibrium prevails, we should see a different pattern of 
response including independent lag structure, as well as signs. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The dataset used in this study is a monthly time-series covering the period 
from 2003-2013, obtained from the Emerging Portfolio Fund Research (EPFR), 
Bloomberg database, CEIC database, the IMF’s International Financial Statistics 
(IFS), as well as Bank of Thailan (BOT) and monetary authorities’ websites in other 
selected countries.
51
 To directly investigate fund manager’s cross-country portfolio 
allocation behavior following the capital control signal by the BOT, a set of selected 
countries in the Asian region are included: Korea, Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, 
Taiwan, as well as Thailand. The criteria for selections are 1) significance in terms of 
market size and 2) geographical location. 
 
4.1 Explanatory Variable: The Capital Control Indexes 
The capital account policies in Thailand are suitable dataset to gauge fund 
manager’s portfolio allocation behavior for several reasons. Firstly, there is a clear 
evolution and changes of controls, from a more relaxed to a well-balanced with wider 
tools used. Second, Thailand’s equity market is highly correlated with other Emerging 
Asian Equity market, which is ideal to gauge cross-country allocation of fund manager 
as a reaction to exogenous capital control measures, as well as both direct and indirect 
                                                 
51
The capital control indexes are constructed from a daily data and the average value is used to 
represent  
the monthly data, same concept applies for the share of foreign gross purchase to the total stock value 
traded. 
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externality effect. Suwanpong (2012) finds that the Stock Exchange of Thailand, along 
with the Hang Seng, and FTSE Bursa Malaysia Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange are 
accountable for the significant innovation spill-over to other markets. Lastly, the Stock 
market of Thailand (SET) is one of the main investment destinations for Emerging 
Market Portfolio. The market significance is reflected by a continued increase in the 
benchmark weight MSCI assigned to Thailand.
52
 Therefore, the signal of capital 
control by the BOT should be closely watched and assessed by major Emerging fund 
managers. Table 1 in the Appendix graphs the rising trend of portfolio weight 
allocated by each fund. 
To capture the fund manager’s response resulting from the imposition of 
Thailand’s capital controls, capital control indexes are constructed based upon the 
information from the BOT, including the press releases, speeches, as well as direct 
cooperation and regulation imposed directly by the BOT to commercial banks and 
financial institutions.
53
 The goal of the index is to quantify the effect resulting from 
changes in the intensity of capital controls, and avoid problems faced by a mere use of 
a binary variable.
54
 
Most papers featuring capital control indexes employ the annual dataset from 
the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 
(AREAER). Despite a comprehensive country and time coverage, such dataset cannot 
                                                 
52
According to Forbes et al. (2012), most fund managers also compare their portfolio weight of a 
particular country to a benchmark weight, MSCI. Some funds that employ indexing strategies would 
adjust allocation within different asset classes to achieve overall weight that is tractable to the MSCI. 
However, MSCI are deemed merely as macro proxy. 
53
Data can be obtained from the BOT website, in the departmental internal order section. 
54
See Gallagher(2012), Schindler (2009), Miniane (2004), and Jongwanich and Kohpaiboon (2012) for 
more detailed application of the capital control indexes 
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capture variations of the capital control measures occurring during the year. As such, 
this paper employs a construction methodology consistent with that of Jongwanich and 
Kohpaiboon (2012), and Lee et al. (2011) in order to obtain the capital control indexes 
dataset in this study. Firstly, the measures are classified into measures relating to 
capital inflows, and measures relating to capital outflows.
55
 
For each announcement, the measure is assigned a value of either -1 or +1; 
those that relax inflows or outflows or both, are assigned a value +1, and -1 otherwise. 
Next, the weight, ranging from 0 to 2, is assigned to each measure, with the goal to 
capture the varying intensity of measures in total and also by flow type. More 
importantly, the severity of the measure in terms of market perception is taken into 
consideration for the weight calculation.
56
 Lastly, after multiplying the weights to each 
measure, the data are sequentially accumulated, which yields the final output; the 
overall capital control, control on inflows, and control on outflows indexes. The 
overall capital control index is also generated to capture the overall impact and serve 
as a useful benchmark. Figure 1 in the Appendix illustrates the evolution of the 
indexes from 2003-2013.
57
 
 Regarding the evolution of Thailand’s capital control policies, the period 2003-
2013 witnessed a dramatic shift from a focus on inflows restriction with outflow 
liberalization, to a more open and balanced stance while enhancing other aspects such 
as risk management and private sector’s financial literacy. The period covered in this 
                                                 
55
Jongwanich and Kohpaiboon (2012) also distinguish between liability and asset side, and also among 
asset classes, but this paper will limit to only to indexes by gross flow type. 
56This is consistent with Jongwanich and Kohpaiboon (2012), and Lee et al. (2011). 
57
The degree of restrictiveness can be directly compared with Schindler 2009 after restricting to 0 to 1, 
and flip sign 
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study can be divided into three main phrases. The first phrase is the pre-URR period, 
2003-2006, with a surge in the capital inflows, especially in form of FDI and portfolio 
investment. Hence, as public pressure
58
 and fear of baht speculation heightened, BOT 
began to impose restrictions on inflows since 2003. At the same time, the central bank 
also began to liberalize controls on outflows, with the hope to achieve a more balanced 
capital flow position. Secondly, there was a brief period of market turmoil with the 
sudden implementation of the URR in 2006. The signaling impact is deemed 
effectively at work during this period. Lastly, the post URR period until the present 
time is characterized by gradual lift of URR measures. All contingent measures 
werefully lifted in 2008. With reduced exchange rate pressure and more arrays of tools 
as a result of the enactment of the BOT Act in 2008, BOT focus more towards outflow 
liberalization measures, coupled with enhanced risk-management and financial 
literacy of the private sector. Table 2 in the Appendix presents key measures taken by 
BOT during 2003-2013.  
 
4.2 Dependent Variable: Fund-level data 
 To explore fund manager’s response, micro-level data is required. In this 
study, we obtain the fund manager’s portfolio allocation data from the Emerging 
Portfolio Fund Research (EPFR) which features data on a fund-based basis.
59
Although 
the database is relatively new, it has become widely used and is the most 
comprehensive resource in terms of both time span and country coverage, especially 
                                                 
58
Media at that time also stressed on large loss on BOT balance sheet as representing ineffective 
management. 
59
 EPFR dataset has been widely used in a number of IMF, and ECB papers, some of which includes 
Forbes et al. (2012), Fratzscher (2011), and Duca (2012). 
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for the Equity funds.
60
 As of 2014, EPFR data covers more than 16,000 equity funds, 
representing more than 260 billion US Dollars in total Asset Under Management. 
Fratzscher (2011) suggests the use of such dataset as it decently tracks the actual 
portfolio flow movement from the Balance of Payments data, despite representing 
only 5-20% of total market capitalization. For this study, we obtain three types of data 
from the EPFR, namely,the fund-level allocation in each country in form of a 
percentage weight of total fund’s assets, the size of each fund in terms of total Asset 
Under Management (AUM), as well as fund flow data for portfolio investment during 
the full sample period. 
To sort out final fund candidates, we employ a similar method as that of Forbes 
et al. (2012). The criteria used are 1) Relevance; funds need to have at least 5 % of 
their AUM in Thailand and 2) Significance; funds need to have at least 1 $ billion in 
AUM in Thailand in the end of 2013. As a result, the sorted funds would be the ones 
that have sufficient exposure and response to the implementation of capital control 
policies by BOT. Moreover, such fund must have data available in all the sample 
country; including Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, and Taiwan during the full 
2003-2013 period. After applying all the criteria, we obtain dataset from 6 Emerging 
Equity funds. These includes 1) Aberdeen Emerging Markets Fund 2) Acadian 
Emerging Markets Portfolio 3) Baillie Emerging Markets Growth Fund 4) Genesis 
Emerging Markets Investment 5) Legg Emerging Markets Trust, and 6) Martin 
                                                 
60
Mainly by the IMF, ECB, and several papers such as Forbes (2011), Fratzscher (2012b), and Miao 
(2012) 
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Emerging Markets Fund. Table 2 represents fund data in terms of size, AUM, and 
mandate.  
Table 2: Fund Information 
Note: % Weight is defined as the percentage weight of their AUM in   
Thailand. Large cap represents funds that mainly select large and stable stocks 
when making portfolio decision. Blend represents funds that select both large 
and medium stocks when making portfolio decision. 
 
4.3 Model specification 
 Following the theoretical model in section 3, the paper attempts to test out 
three hypotheses as followed: 
Hypothesis 1: If wait-and-see hypothesis due to heterogeneous beliefs of fund manager 
true, should see a lagged response following capital control  
Hypothesis 2: if signaling hypothesis due to heterogeneous beliefs of fund manager is 
true, we should see a mixed coefficient sign of capital control  
Hypothesis 3: If the mutually inclusive hypothesis prevails, we should see a different 
pattern of response including independent lag structure, as well as signs. 
Fund AUM % Weight Fund Mandate Style
Aberdeen 2.2 10 Equity Large cap
Acadian 2.7 8.7 Equity Large cap
Baillie 1.1 7.5 Equity blend
Genesis 1 5 Equity blend
Legg 1 8.4 Equity Large cap
Martin 1 10.8 Equity blend
 42 
 Building upon such underlying theoretical principles, we derive ARIMA 
equations for individual fund regression to capture individual heterogeneity and test 
out for fund’s unique investment responses. We are interested in how changes in the 
intensity of Thailand’s capital controls determine changes in foreigner’s portfolio 
allocation across countries, aspect of which cannot be captured by a mere use of the 
binary variables,
61
  we employ the first-difference format of the equation (1) to obtain 
our benchmark equation (4). This is the same specification as that of Forbes et 
al.(2012).
62
 The same specification applies for when the total control indexes are 
replaced with inflow controls (equation (2) and (5)), and outflow controls (equation 
(3) and (6)), respectively. 
4.3.1 ARIMA equations:  
1 1
n n
ijt ijt i t i i t i ijt
i i
CC      
 
          (1) 
      
1 1
n n
ijt i t i i t i ijt
i i
CC    
 
                 (2) 
Where ɷit represents the share of portfolio allocated to country i by fund j at 
time t. CCt
TH represents the level of Thailand’s capital control indexes at time t. ɷi,t-
1
benchmark 
is the weight of portfolio allocation that fund j allocates to the country 
initiating the capital control, Thailand, lagged by one period. θi,t is a vector of 
Autoregressive (AR) and Moving Average (MA) terms, and εi,t is the error term.  
The same calculation applies for CCinft,
TH Thailand’s inflow controls index, and 
CCoutft,,
TH
 Thailand’s outflow controls index.  
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 See Gallagher (2012) 
62
 Forbes et al. (2012) tested on the Brazil’s data from 2006-2011. 
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Later on, we also explore the indirect externality effect through two channels. 
First, the portfolio allocation change in the initiating country, Thailand, in the previous 
period can represent one of the indirect channels capturing the impact of the BOT 
capital control policies. Second, we incorporate the interaction term as the next 
indirect channel, the product of prior portfolio weight in Thailand and the capital 
control policies, both lagged by one period.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULT 
 
 
5.1 Tests 
Before proceeding to the ARIMA model, we need to verify whether the model 
suffers from potential serious biases resulting from the presence of an endogenous 
variable or endogeneity bias. Since our model posits there is a time lag, all explanatory 
variables are lagged at least by one period. This excludes the potential bias resulting 
from simultaneity, which can lead to serious problem of inconsistent estimates. 
Regarding omitted or third variable bias, section V. and the robustness section will 
show that the degree of cross-equation correlation is relatively low across funds in 
each country and the Seemingly Unrelated Regression does not hold for this 
theoretical model. 
 
5.1.1. Stationarity 
In order to avoid the problem of spurious regression, we test for the stationarity 
property of each time-series before proceeding with the regression. An Augmented 
Dicky-Fuller test is performed for each country’s dataset. Results from table 5 shows 
that all the data are I(1), hence becoming stationary after being first-differenced.
63
 
                                                 
63
Some variables are level stationary I(0). See table 6-8. 
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Therefore, the coefficients obtained from our model specification do not suffer from 
the spurious relationship. 
 
5.1.2. Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation 
 Although the presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation still result in 
unbiased estimates, it is no longer the Best Linear Unbiased Estimates (BLUE) and 
will lead to invalid testing. Therefore, the White test for heteroscedasticity (with and 
without cross product terms) and the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test on 
residuals are performed for each ARIMA specification. The results shown in table 6 
and 7 reveal that 19 out of 36 regressions suffer from either heteroscedasticity or 
autocorrelation. Therefore, we resort to the Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation 
Consistent (HAC) covariance estimatesto arrive at robust estimates and valid testing.
64
 
As a result of the HAC method, there are 2 funds where one of the coefficients of the 
lagged capital control terms becomes insignificant after the HAC standard errors are 
used. The rest of the regression estimates yield the same result in terms of sign and 
significance.  
 
5.1.3. Normality 
 Although non-normality still results in unbiased estimates, the distribution of  
the residuals can indicate the degree of model misspecification. We report the 
histograms of all the regressions and perform the Jacque-Bera test to see whether the 
residuals are normally distributed. For Korea, all the regressions result in normally-
                                                 
64
The HAC method makes a correction directly to the standard errors. 
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distributed residuals. For other countries in the sample, there are on average four funds 
that have non-normal residual distribution. Although the cross-equation correlation is 
low
65
, we resort to robust standard estimates for all regressions to ensure a valid 
testing
66
. All the results, including the Jacque-Bera statistics and histograms are presented 
in table 6. 
 
5.1.4. Cross-Equation Correlation  
 Since a strong degree of cross-equation correlation can signify the 
misspecification of the model, potentially resulting from the omitted or third variable 
bias.
67
  We have conducted the correlation analysis and report both the degree of 
correlation as well as the p-value resulting from all the pair-wise t-tests shown in table 
7. The results show that only two funds are mainly responsible for the cross-equation 
correlation whereas for the remaining pair-wise correlation, the correlation is as low as 
0.2 on averages. To completely resolve the issue, the Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
model as an alternative method will be discussed in the robustness section. 
 
5.2 Regression Results 
Following the ARIMA model specification described in section 3, we estimate 
the first-difference equation for the 6 selected funds in each country. The same steps 
are repeated for total capital control indexes, and for inflows and outflows control 
                                                 
65
This implies there is no serious bias issue in the estimated coefficients resulting from non-normality in 
the residuals. 
66
For time-series regression, the HAC estimates of the standard errors are sufficient to resolve the issue. 
67
The condition where there are a number of variables that are causal to the dependent variable and also 
correlate with the explanatory variables but are not correctly specified in the model. This leads to 
inconsistent estimates. 
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indexes, respectively. The results are presented in table 8 with robust standard errors. 
The central results following our three priori hypothesis are presented in as followed. 
 
5.2.1 ARIMA Results 
The individual ARIMA regression results confirm the validity of the model as 
the main explanatory variables, the capital control indexes, are significant, in all 
countries. The different ARIMA specification also confirms individual heterogeneity 
across fund and across country, which also reinforces the signaling hypothesis and the 
mutually inclusive hypothesis as fund managers react to the exogenous capital control 
signal differently when devising portfolio allocation in different countries. Meanwhile, 
we observe that the indirect externality effect varies, both in degree and significance 
for each fund. 
 
5.2.2. Wait-and-see Hypothesis 
Regarding the timing, our paper relaxes the assumption and posits that there is a 
time lag before each fund manager engages in portfolio reallocation following the 
capital control signal from Thailand. If the wait-and-see hypothesis is valid, we should 
see a significant coefficient for the lagged capital control terms for each of the 36 
regressions. This means that the fund managers do not immediately respond to the 
capital control signal, whether due to heterogeneous belief, institutional barriers, or 
fund’s own styles. This is an extension to the Huddart (1999) model. The results are 
clearly in support of the wait-and-see hypothesis. As shown in table 8,  
the coefficients of the lagged capital control terms are significant for 31 out of 36 of 
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the ARIMA regressions. The exception includes Aberdeen fund in Indonesia and 
Philippines, as well as Genesis, Legg, and Martin funds in Thailand, Taiwan, and 
Philippines, respectively. The direction of the response will be further discussed in the 
signaling hypothesis. From table 3, most of the funds respond within the first two 
quarters of the capital control signal. 
The significance of ARMA terms in all ARIMA equations also support that there 
is inertia and idiosyncratic trend in investment behavior. This factor also contributes to 
the lagged response effect as fund managers would be unwilling to completely adjust 
their portfolio weight immediately following the capital control signal. The 
significance of the individual persistent trend is also reflected by the significance of 
the MA terms, which will be illustrated in more detail when the Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression models are tested in the robustness section.  
 
5.2.3. Signaling Hypothesis 
The priori signaling hypothesis that would support the separating equilibrium 
is one where the sign of the coefficients regarding the fund manager’s response in 
terms of portfolio weight upon receiving the exogenous capital control vary from one 
fund to another, giving a mixed sign of coefficient across funds in one country. Any 
good type fund manager, upon obtaining the capital control signal, might respond by 
reducing the overall weight in the assets of sample country (deemed as risky asset A in 
Huddart (1999) model) whereas the other increases. Hence, if the fund manager 
decides to allocate more weight w into risky assets, they consider such exogenous 
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signal as good (G). The contrary situation applies when they perceive the same signal 
as bad (B).  
Results in table 3 support the signaling hypothesis. For every country, namely, 
Thailand, Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, and Taiwan, the 6 funds respond 
differently to the capital control signal. For example, Aberdeen fund decides to 
increase the allocated weight to Korea while Legg reduces. Notice that the time frame 
also varies, reflected by the different AR lag term. This will be further discussed in the 
Mutually Inclusive hypothesis in the following section. 
Table 3: Signaling Hypothesis Results 
Fund 
Country Aberdeen Acadian Baillie Genesis Legg Martin 
Korea 
+(2)**, 
 -(3)** +(4)** +(2)** +(4)*** 
-(1)**, 
+(6)* +(1)*** 
Malaysia 
+(4)**,  
-(6)** -(2), +(3)** 
+(6)**, 
+(7)** 
+(1)**, 
 -(2)** +(8)**  
Indonesia 
 +(1)** 
+(3)**,  
-(10)* +(4)** -(6)** +(1)*** 
Philippines 
 
-
(1)**,+(2)** 
-(2)**, 
+(5)** 
+(3)**,  
-(5)** 
-(1)***,  
-(10)**  
Taiwan 
+(2)*, -
(4)** -(8)** -(1)** 
+(3)**, -
(5)**  
+(2)**, 
 -(3)*** 
Thailand 
+(10)** 
-(1)**,+(3)*, 
-(4)** +(1)**  +(4)** 
+(1)**, 
+(4)** 
Note: The number in the bracket represents the significant lagged capital control term for each ARIMA 
regression and the coefficient sign is presented in front of the lagged terms. 
*, **, ***Represents significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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5.2.4. Separating Equilibrium 
The main point of the paper is to demonstrate that a separating equilibrium, one 
where good type fund managers are able to differentiate themselves from the pool by 
following a more independent an aggressive pattern of portfolio investing can prevail. 
This is radically different from many herding papers which concludes that the 
asymmetric information setting between the investor and fund managers coupled with 
career concern will usually result in a pooling equilibrium whereby the good type fund 
manager choose to ignore the exogenous signal and herd with the market. 
The results from table 9, as well as the justification of hypothesis 1 and 2 
support the separating equilibrium outcome. Obviously, there is a significant and 
independent lag structures across fund and country in the 36 funds presented. This is 
reflected by the different ARMA specification for each fund in the 6 countries. The 
rigorous individuality is further affirmed in the robustness section. Table 8 in the 
Appendix presents all the regression results. In addition, the signaling hypothesis 
shows that the direction can go both ways, depending on individual fund manager’s 
interpretation of the capital control signal. Meanwhile, timing also differs, confirming 
the wait-and-see hypothesis and an independent lag structure. Hence, the valid 
hypothesis 1 and 2 represents a different investing pattern which corresponds to the 
separating equilibrium outcome. Meanwhile, regression results confirm the presence 
of indirect externality effect, but it varies in terms of significance by fund. This further 
reaffirms the heterogeneous pattern. 
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5.3 Robustness Test 
The Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) 
 Throughout the model, the individuality of the ARIMA regression captures  
the heterogeneity of investment pattern across fund and country, which confirms the 
separating equilibrium whereby fund manager follows a different and independent 
pattern of portfolio allocation following an exogenous capital control signal. From 
section 4.1, we observe the presence of cross-equation correlation in residuals. With 
an attempt to test out alternative hypothesis and increase the efficiency of the model, 
we also test the theoretical framework using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression with 
Autoregressive (AR) specification as the empirical tool. The results depicted in table 9 
reveals that the SUR model does not hold, which in turn reaffirms the heterogeneity 
nature of the results, also through the importance of the MA terms that capture fund-
specific persistent investment pattern.  
One plausible explanation is the low degree of cross-equation correlation, 
which renders low marginal benefit from an attempt to increase estimation efficiency 
via the use of SUR.  Here, the trade of in harnessing the error terms is explanatory 
power versus efficiency. With a strong degree of individual heterogeneity, using the 
Moving Average (MA) terms to capture the persistent individual trend renders 
meaningful results while the SUR does not provide a significant explanatory power 
through increased efficiency. This also eliminates much of the concern on omitted 
variable bias. Given the theoretical framework and empirical goodness of fit, the 
ARIMA model is the one that can capture the varying investment pattern.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
This paper builds on earlier reputation model and investigates fund manager’s 
response when given an exogenous signal, which, in this case, is the capital control 
signal by the Bank of Thailand (BOT).In so doing, this paper seeks to test out three 
hypotheses 1) the Wait-and-see hypothesis 2) the Signaling Hypothesis, and 3) 
Separating Equilibrium. We build on earlier signaling model of Huddart (1999) and 
incorporate the three aforementioned hypotheses into the model using a novel fund-
level dataset by the Emerging Portfolio Fund Research (EPFR)
68
 dating from 2003-
2013 in six Emerging Asia countries; Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Indonesia,  
The Philippines, and Thailand. Also, we construct a higher frequency capital control 
index by flow types in order to further differentiate the resulting potency of control 
measures. In order to capture idiosyncratic pattern in fund manager’s response, we 
employ the ARIMA model specification for each regression, and later on modified it 
to include indirect externality effects. 
The result confirms that a separating equilibrium outcome in portfolio 
investment patterns of mutual fund managers can sustain following a common 
exogenous capital control policy signal. In this regard, good fund managers will try to 
                                                 
68
This dataset is by far the most comprehensive resource for portfolio investment data, used in several 
research works by the International Monetary Fund, European Central Bank, and academic institutions. 
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separate themselves from the pool by taking excessive risk through their portfolio 
choices. In our sample, the individualistic investment pattern varies both by fund and 
by country, representing a separating equilibrium outcome. For example, Aberdeen 
fund manager tends to respond to BOT capital control signals within the first two 
months when making portfolio allocation in Korea. However, it can take them as long 
as ten months to make a significant shift in portfolio weight in Thailand. In addition, 
in the following two months after BOT issued the capital control policies, Acadian 
fund manager increases their portfolio weight to the Philippines whereas Baillie fund 
manager decreases theirs. This result is in support of the signaling hypothesis, where 
fund managers respond differently to capital control signals due to their heterogeneous 
beliefs. Also, it takes all the fund managers at least one month to make a noticeable 
change in portfolio allocation following BOT capital control signals, confirming  
the wait-and-see hypothesis. 
All the findings shed light on how macroeconomics policy results in 
idiosyncratic response of individual agents that can be used to assess potentially 
distortion to the overall welfare. Future research includes an examination of the role of 
reputation effect in determining the separating equilibrium outcome, which requires  
a construction of fund manager’s reputation index. Also, overall distortions as a result 
of the fund manager’s reputation effect should also be investigated. 
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APPENDIX  
 
 
Table 4: Key Capital Control Measures Taken by BOT from 2003-2013 
Date Capital Control Measure 
Sep 2003  Impose a limit for the amount of Thai Baht that domestic financial 
institutions can borrow from non-resident without underlying trade and 
investment value to only up to 50 million baht per entity. The rule applies to all 
transactions with maturity of less than three months.  
Oct 2003  Impose a limit for the daily outstanding balance of the Non-resident Baht 
Account to a maximum of 300 million baht per non-resident. But 
exceptions can be made on a case by case basis by the BOT.  
Nov 2006  Strongly urge domestic financial institutions not to issue and sell baht-
denominated bills of exchange to non-residents for all maturities. 
Dec 2006  Prohibit financial institutions from engaging in any transaction involving a 
sell and buy back for all types of debt securities at all maturities.  
 Prohibit financial institutions from buying and selling foreign currencies 
with non-residents or to credit or debit the Non-resident Baht Accounts for 
the settlements relating to investments in government bonds, treasury bills 
or BOT bonds with maturity of less than three months.  
 Limit the baht borrowing transaction permissible to only for transaction 
with maturity of at least six months.  
 URR: Require an upfront 30% deposit of foreign exchange with BOT for 
all foreign transactions, except those related to trade in goods and services, 
repatriation of investment abroad by residents, and FDI. The full deposit 
amount will be returned after funds have remained within Thailand for 
more than one year; otherwise, only two-thirds of the amount will be 
refunded. 
Jan 2007  Limit the end-of-day balance for SNS account to a maximum of 300 
million baht for non-resident 
Nov 2007  Cut the allowable ceiling for foreign ownership for financial institutions to 
49%, from 100%. 
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Date Capital Control Measure 
Feb 2008  Revise down the limit for domestic financial institutions’ baht borrowings 
from nonresidents with no underlying trade or investment for all maturities 
to a maximum of 10 million baht outstanding balance per group of 
nonresidents.  
 Limit the maximum amount permissible for the provision of Thai baht 
liquidity by domestic financial institutions to nonresidents with no 
underlying trade or investment to no more than 300 million baht 
outstanding balance per group of nonresidents. 
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Table 5: Results from the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
ADF Test 
statistics 
Thailand Korea Malaysia Taiwan Indonesia Philippines 
Aberdeen 
-7.656*** -10.187*** -17.809*** -9.162*** -15.548*** -9.162*** 
Acadian 
-8.542*** -10.814*** -10.704*** -9.888*** -10.719*** -9.888*** 
Baillie 
-13.972*** -13.394*** -8.064*** -7.765*** -9.990*** -7.765*** 
Genesis 
-11.140*** -10.347*** -13.286*** -9.995*** -11.434*** -9.995*** 
Legg 
-9.940*** -10.866*** -12.932*** -9.667*** -10.832*** -9.667*** 
Martin 
-18.554*** -18.554*** -16.838*** -13.164*** -12.460*** -13.164*** 
CC 
-8.365*** 
     
CCINF 
-10.175*** 
     
CCOUTF 
-9.505*** 
     
Note: MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values are used. 
*, **, ***Represents significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, meaning data series are first-
differenced stationary. 
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Figure 2.2: Fund Allocation (Malaysia) 
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Figure 2.4: Fund Allocation (Indonesia) 
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Figure 2.5: Fund Allocation (Taiwan) 
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Figure 3.1: Histograms and Jacque-Bera Normality Tests Thailand) 
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Figure 3.1: Histograms and Jacque-Bera Normality Test (Thailand) 
(Continued) 
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Figure 3.1: Histograms and Jacque-Bera Normality Test (Thailand) 
(Continued) 
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Figure 3.2: Histograms and Jacque-Bera Normality Test (Korea) 
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Figure 3.2: Histograms and Jacque-Bera Normality Test (Korea) (Continued) 
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Figure 3.3: Histograms and Jacque-Bera Normality Test (Malaysia) 
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Figure 3.3: Histograms and Jacque-Bera Normality Test (Malaysia) 
(Continued) 
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Figure 3.3: Histograms and Jacque-Bera Normality Test (Malaysia) 
(Continued) 
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Figure 3.4: Histograms and Jacque-Bera Normality Test (Philippines) 
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Figure 3.4: Histograms and Jacque-Bera Normality Test (Philippines) (Continued) 
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Figure 3.5: Histograms and Jacque-Bera Normality Test (Taiwan) 
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Figure 3.5: Histograms and Jacque-Bera Normality Test (Taiwan) (Continued) 
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Figure 3.5: Histograms and Jacque-Bera Normality Test (Taiwan) (Continued) 
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Figure 3.6: Histograms and Jacque-Bera Normality Test (Indonesia) 
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Figure 3.6: Histograms and Jacque-Bera Normality Test (Indonesia) 
(Continued) 
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Figure 3.6: Histograms and Jacque-Bera Normality Test (Indonesia) (Continued) 
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Table 6: Results from the White Heteroscedasticity Test 
 
 
F- Test 
statistics 
Thailand Korea Malaysia Taiwan Indonesia Philippines 
Aberdeen 0.593*** 1.202*** 4.048 1.061*** 0.981*** 0.915*** 
Acadian 0.917*** 1.134*** 1.590** 1.081 2.450 1.161*** 
Baillie 3.564 1.886*** 1.157*** 3.554 0.793*** 1.264*** 
Genesis 2.038 0.767*** 1.055*** 2.323 3.108 2.271 
Legg 0.173*** 1.156*** 1.237*** 1.459* 1.376*** 0.910*** 
Martin 1.2497*** 1.436*** 1.467* 2.919 2.425 0.907*** 
Note: *, **, ***Represents significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, meaning data    
series are homoscedastic. 
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Table 7: Results from the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test 
 
 
F- Test 
statistics 
Thailand Korea Malaysia Taiwan Indonesia Philippines 
Aberdeen 0.480*** 0.092*** 0.104*** 1.237*** 1.993*** 0.032*** 
Acadian 0.385*** 0.301*** 0.369*** 1.292*** 1.278*** 0.197*** 
Baillie 10.736 2.306* 0.958*** 6.454 1.652*** 5.703 
Genesis 1.273*** 0.012*** 0.497*** 0.458*** 1.213*** 0.725*** 
Legg 11.380 1.863 0.343*** 1.278*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 
Martin 0.026*** 5.498 0.540*** 0.039*** 0.245*** 0.621*** 
Note: *, **, ***Represents significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, meaning the 
regression does not suffer from serial correlation. 
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Table 8.1: Cross-correlation Analysis (Korea) 
 
Table 8.2: Cross-correlation Analysis (Malaysia) 
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Table 8.3: Cross-correlation Analysis (Indonesia) 
 
 
Table 8.4: Cross-correlation Analysis (Philippines) 
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Table 8.5: Cross-correlation Analysis (Taiwan) 
 
Table 8.6: Cross-correlation Analysis (Thailand) 
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Table 9.1: Regression Results (Thailand) 
Aberdeen 
Dependent variable: DAberdeen 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
DCCINF(-10) 0.186562 0.073489 2.538633 0.0125
DCCINF(-5) -0.307014 0.193207 -1.589042 0.1149
DCCINF(-3) 0.205084 0.198973 1.030711 0.3049
AR(1) -0.914059 0.051152 -17.86961 0.0000
MA(3) -0.625863 0.075538 -8.285406 0.0000
MA(2) -0.910285 0.047824 -19.03426 0.0000
MA(1) 0.585398 0.102114 5.732779 0.0000
MA(14) 0.115080 0.029006 3.967455 0.0001
R-squared 0.428365     Mean dependent var 0.057059
Adjusted R-squared 0.392316     S.D. dependent var 1.959159
S.E. of regression 1.527245     Akaike info criterion 3.749669
Sum squared resid 258.9050     Schwarz criterion 3.936500
Log likelihood -215.1053     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.825535
Durbin-Watson stat 2.013931     Wald F-statistic 2.450469
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.067268  
 
Acadian 
Dependent variable: Dacadian 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
DCCINF(-3) 0.514457 0.146884 3.502481 0.0007
DCCINF(-1) -0.379965 0.091730 -4.142194 0.0001
DCCINF(-4) -0.353984 0.153661 -2.303675 0.0230
AR(3) -0.299279 0.098693 -3.032425 0.0030
MA(1) -0.746171 0.047099 -15.84272 0.0000
MA(19) -0.667095 0.046704 -14.28343 0.0000
MA(20) 0.821773 0.038067 21.58734 0.0000
R-squared 0.593544     Mean dependent var 0.050407
Adjusted R-squared 0.572520     S.D. dependent var 2.468939
S.E. of regression 1.614240     Akaike info criterion 3.850832
Sum squared resid 302.2694     Schwarz criterion 4.010875
Log likelihood -229.8262     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.915842
Durbin-Watson stat 2.096264     Wald F-statistic 7.601990
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000110  
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
DCCINF(-1) 0.228192 0.121704 1.874979 0.0633
DCCINF(-2) -0.141030 0.145366 -0.970176 0.3340
DCCINF(-3) 0.089682 0.153440 0.584474 0.5600
AR(4) -0.174948 0.077856 -2.247051 0.0265
MA(2) -0.374659 0.092350 -4.056930 0.0001
MA(1) -0.707849 0.104453 -6.776709 0.0000
MA(12) -0.105958 0.087876 -1.205766 0.2304
R-squared 0.400644     Mean dependent var 0.037805
Adjusted R-squared 0.369643     S.D. dependent var 1.702028
S.E. of regression 1.351326     Akaike info criterion 3.495276
Sum squared resid 211.8254     Schwarz criterion 3.655319
Log likelihood -207.9595     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.560285
Durbin-Watson stat 2.092024     Wald F-statistic 3.466540
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.018549
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
DCCINF(-1) 0.191365 0.097597 1.960761 0.0522
AR(1) 0.260446 0.097099 2.682262 0.0083
AR(4) 0.026102 0.083637 0.312085 0.7555
MA(1) -1.049537 0.117669 -8.919377 0.0000
MA(12) -0.156343 0.071773 -2.178308 0.0313
R-squared 0.427110     Mean dependent var 0.001920
Adjusted R-squared 0.408014     S.D. dependent var 2.099369
S.E. of regression 1.615268     Akaike info criterion 3.836057
Sum squared resid 313.0909     Schwarz criterion 3.949190
Log likelihood -234.7536     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.882017
Durbin-Watson stat 2.108366     Wald F-statistic 3.844586
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.052224
Table 9.1: Regression Results (Thailand) (Continued) 
 
Baillie 
Dependent variable: DBaillie 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Genesis 
Dependent variable: DGenesis 
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Table 9.1: Regression Results (Thailand) (Continued) 
 Legg 
Dependent variable: DLegg 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
DCCINF 0.301156 0.164527 1.830434 0.0698
DCCINF(-4) 0.234319 0.100671 2.327587 0.0217
DCCINF(-1) -0.201548 0.171077 -1.178112 0.2412
AR(3) -0.222869 0.144058 -1.547082 0.1246
AR(1) -0.227888 0.145055 -1.571043 0.1189
AR(2) -0.401075 0.128150 -3.129716 0.0022
MA(1) -0.515678 0.092655 -5.565592 0.0000
MA(19) -0.419334 0.086960 -4.822162 0.0000
R-squared 0.429073     Mean dependent var 0.068293
Adjusted R-squared 0.394320     S.D. dependent var 2.199484
S.E. of regression 1.711757     Akaike info criterion 3.975747
Sum squared resid 336.9631     Schwarz criterion 4.158654
Log likelihood -236.5085     Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.050043
Durbin-Watson stat 2.002706     Wald F-statistic 2.325916
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.078433  
Martin 
Dependent variable: DMartin 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
DCCINF(-4) 0.193962 0.085067 2.280103 0.0244
DCCINF(-1) 0.229725 0.137767 1.667498 0.0980
DCCINF -0.312892 0.143669 -2.177877 0.0314
MA(1) -0.495976 0.092308 -5.373077 0.0000
MA(5) 0.308815 0.072269 4.273147 0.0000
MA(12) 0.339855 0.109979 3.090181 0.0025
R-squared 0.338970     Mean dependent var 0.038571
Adjusted R-squared 0.311428     S.D. dependent var 1.863687
S.E. of regression 1.546493     Akaike info criterion 3.756304
Sum squared resid 286.9968     Schwarz criterion 3.891365
Log likelihood -230.6472     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.811175
Durbin-Watson stat 1.911756     Wald F-statistic 3.996143
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.009421  
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Table 9.2: Regression Results (Korea) 
 
Aberdeen 
Dependent variable: DAberdeen 
 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DCCOUTF(-2) 2.537662 0.701556 3.617188 0.0004 
DCCOUTF(-3) -2.895655 0.702968 -4.119184 0.0001 
DABERDEEN_TH(-1) -0.202400 0.198896 -1.017618 0.3110 
DABERDEEN_TH(-1)*DCCOUTF(-1) 0.703502 0.325388 2.162043 0.0327 
DCCINF(-11) 0.213170 0.407873 0.522638 0.6022 
AR(1) 0.754166 0.032192 23.42699 0.0000 
AR(2) -0.925234 0.026686 -34.67179 0.0000 
MA(1) -1.349140 0.065402 -20.62837 0.0000 
MA(2) 1.438230 0.047121 30.52211 0.0000 
MA(3) -0.700749 0.063835 -10.97755 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.431164     Mean dependent var -0.222372 
Adjusted R-squared 0.387407     S.D. dependent var 5.650471 
S.E. of regression 4.422529     Akaike info criterion 5.886768 
Sum squared resid 2288.375     Schwarz criterion 6.110719 
Log likelihood -363.8097     Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.977756 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.032118     Wald F-statistic 6.153183 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000042    
 
Acadian 
Dependent variable: DAcadian 
 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DCCINF(-4) 0.931224 0.384340 2.422914 0.0172 
DGENESIS_TH(-1) -0.185411 0.083160 -2.229554 0.0280 
AR(17) 0.199520 0.059275 3.366003 0.0011 
AR(6) -0.264868 0.082136 -3.224750 0.0017 
AR(2) 0.521096 0.100279 5.196472 0.0000 
AR(3) -0.214526 0.059258 -3.620177 0.0005 
MA(2) -0.960867 0.047997 -20.01921 0.0000 
MA(3) 0.629944 0.067555 9.324861 0.0000 
MA(1) -0.393377 0.086153 -4.566040 0.0000 
MA(6) 0.289616 0.055904 5.180580 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.402247     Mean dependent var -0.033828 
Adjusted R-squared 0.349504     S.D. dependent var 4.310987 
S.E. of regression 3.476954     Akaike info criterion 5.415235 
Sum squared resid 1233.099     Schwarz criterion 5.657959 
Log likelihood -293.2532     Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.513716 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.921180     Wald F-statistic 3.928334 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.022723    
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Table 9.2: Regression Results (Korea) (Continued) 
 
Baillie 
Dependent variable: DBaillie 
 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DCCINF(-2) 0.841811 0.218896 3.845706 0.0003 
DBAILLIE_TH(-1) 0.342446 0.299735 1.142496 0.2572 
DBAILLIE_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) 0.865316 0.414368 2.088277 0.0405 
AR(1) -0.616848 0.086405 -7.138997 0.0000 
AR(2) 0.285475 0.111673 2.556334 0.0128 
AR(3) 0.662472 0.132783 4.989143 0.0000 
AR(21) -0.178526 0.046049 -3.876887 0.0002 
AR(4) 0.334676 0.093065 3.596155 0.0006 
MA(3) -0.157547 0.055510 -2.838199 0.0060 
MA(1) -0.048124 0.004791 -10.04393 0.0000 
MA(6) 0.549717 0.004792 114.7134 0.0000 
MA(2) -1.219389 0.049458 -24.65483 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.661901     Mean dependent var 0.107407 
Adjusted R-squared 0.608001     S.D. dependent var 5.737890 
S.E. of regression 3.592483     Akaike info criterion 5.531518 
Sum squared resid 890.5094     Schwarz criterion 5.886251 
Log likelihood -212.0265     Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.673841 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.031349     Wald F-statistic 5.285749 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.002437    
 
 
Legg 
Dependent variable: DLegg 
 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DCCINF(-1) -0.505613 0.228393 -2.213782 0.0287 
DCCINF(-6) 0.901980 0.231563 3.895189 0.0002 
DLEGG_TH(-1) 0.407916 0.193812 2.104698 0.0374 
DLEGG_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) 0.681775 0.267894 2.544941 0.0122 
AR(1) -0.259146 0.173569 -1.493038 0.1381 
MA(1) -0.309696 0.099517 -3.111994 0.0023 
MA(19) -0.547719 0.060833 -9.003705 0.0000 
MA(20) 0.296873 0.081550 3.640376 0.0004 
MA(2) -0.394334 0.059721 -6.602899 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.461612     Mean dependent var -0.075781 
Adjusted R-squared 0.425418     S.D. dependent var 4.262798 
S.E. of regression 3.231251     Akaike info criterion 5.251334 
Sum squared resid 1242.477     Schwarz criterion 5.451867 
Log likelihood -327.0854     Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.332812 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.006178     Wald F-statistic 5.293353 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000586    
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Table 9.2: Regression Results (Korea) (Continued) 
 
Genesis 
Dependent variable: DGenesis 
 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DCCINF(-4) 0.699961 0.391360 1.788533 0.0767 
DGENESIS_TH(-1) -0.086750 0.084320 -1.028829 0.3060 
DGENESIS_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) 0.259344 0.123139 2.106102 0.0377 
AR(17) 0.179346 0.054519 3.289585 0.0014 
AR(6) -0.270318 0.066750 -4.049679 0.0001 
AR(2) 0.553115 0.101523 5.448146 0.0000 
AR(3) -0.186124 0.051960 -3.582095 0.0005 
MA(2) -1.006894 0.031539 -31.92502 0.0000 
MA(3) 0.640764 0.079606 8.049149 0.0000 
MA(1) -0.347210 0.089057 -3.898722 0.0002 
MA(6) 0.300484 0.059710 5.032378 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.429950     Mean dependent var -0.033828 
Adjusted R-squared 0.373509     S.D. dependent var 4.310987 
S.E. of regression 3.412197     Akaike info criterion 5.385640 
Sum squared resid 1175.952     Schwarz criterion 5.652635 
Log likelihood -290.5958     Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.493968 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.925872     Wald F-statistic 8.078985 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000071    
 
 
Martin 
Dependent variable: DMartin 
 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DCCOUTF(-1) 2.062773 0.532116 3.876546 0.0002 
DMARTIN_TH(-1) -0.215109 0.204953 -1.049550 0.2964 
DMARTIN_TH(-1)*DCCOUTF(-1) -0.824749 0.189057 -4.362432 0.0000 
DCCOUTF(-2) -1.217572 0.596517 -2.041137 0.0438 
AR(20) 0.408969 0.085727 4.770586 0.0000 
MA(20) -0.852901 0.040223 -21.20422 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.409554     Mean dependent var -0.100000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.380891     S.D. dependent var 4.032886 
S.E. of regression 3.173215     Akaike info criterion 5.200840 
Sum squared resid 1037.137     Schwarz criterion 5.348988 
Log likelihood -277.4458     Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.260919 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.312805     Wald F-statistic 7.147167 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000040    
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Table 9.3: Regression Results (Malaysia) 
 
Aberdeen 
Dependent variable: DAberdeen 
 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DCCINF(-6) -0.286033 0.141035 -2.028100 0.0443 
DCCOUTF(-4) 0.343375 0.128007 2.682470 0.0081 
DABERDEEN_TH(-1) 0.058831 0.130606 0.450445 0.6530 
DABERDEEN_TH(-1)*DCCOUTF(-1) -0.166509 0.212099 -0.785054 0.4336 
AR(1) -0.572993 0.173685 -3.299031 0.0012 
MA(2) -0.444074 0.141123 -3.146725 0.0020 
MA(3) -0.321588 0.117974 -2.725932 0.0072 
MA(4) -0.178523 0.090773 -1.966687 0.0510 
     
     R-squared 0.246219     Mean dependent var 0.090686 
Adjusted R-squared 0.211505     S.D. dependent var 2.323252 
S.E. of regression 2.062983     Akaike info criterion 4.334890 
Sum squared resid 646.8968     Schwarz criterion 4.488649 
Log likelihood -338.7912     Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.397326 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.834784     Wald F-statistic 3.244130 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.013796    
 
 
Acadian 
Dependent variable: DAcadian 
 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DCC(-2) -0.673345 0.196828 -3.420978 0.0009 
DCC(-3) 0.698425 0.187299 3.728933 0.0003 
DACADIAN_TH(-1) 0.059888 0.066105 0.905956 0.3668 
DACADIAN_TH(-1)*DCC(-1) 0.097407 0.043038 2.263248 0.0255 
AR(1) -0.648137 0.115490 -5.612084 0.0000 
AR(2) -0.496721 0.133658 -3.716366 0.0003 
AR(3) -0.553899 0.113902 -4.862953 0.0000 
MA(2) -0.095435 0.060022 -1.589992 0.1145 
MA(4) -0.836232 0.059820 -13.97912 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.433874     Mean dependent var 0.052937 
Adjusted R-squared 0.395164     S.D. dependent var 2.065939 
S.E. of regression 1.606705     Akaike info criterion 3.854997 
Sum squared resid 302.0357     Schwarz criterion 4.057589 
Log likelihood -233.8648     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.937304 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.989812     Wald F-statistic 6.238081 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000138    
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Table 9.3: Regression Results (Malaysia) (Continued) 
 
Baillie 
Dependent variable: DBaillie 
 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DCCINF(-6) 0.819992 0.200627 4.087149 0.0001 
DBAILLIE_TH(-1) -0.053491 0.072393 -0.738904 0.4617 
DBAILLIE_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) 0.101717 0.156720 0.649039 0.5178 
DCCINF(-7) 0.564846 0.239034 2.363033 0.0201 
DVIX(-1) -0.012111 0.021951 -0.551735 0.5824 
DRDIFF(-1) 2.060772 1.012964 2.034399 0.0446 
DMSCI(-1) -79.47450 135.4159 -0.586892 0.5586 
DOUTPERF(-1) -0.987790 3.603524 -0.274118 0.7846 
AR(1) 0.387298 0.099365 3.897721 0.0002 
AR(2) 0.638260 0.101520 6.287053 0.0000 
MA(2) -0.849791 0.134267 -6.329115 0.0000 
MA(4) -0.102881 0.129022 -0.797393 0.4271 
     
     R-squared 0.518016     Mean dependent var 2.691786 
Adjusted R-squared 0.464998     S.D. dependent var 1.902799 
S.E. of regression 1.391780     Akaike info criterion 3.600001 
Sum squared resid 193.7052     Schwarz criterion 3.891269 
Log likelihood -189.6001     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.718178 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.007622     Wald F-statistic 2.896234 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.006046    
 
 
Legg 
Dependent variable: DLegg 
 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DCCOUT(-8) 0.242764 0.120363 2.016934 0.0461 
DLEGG_TH(-1) 0.271385 0.098338 2.759703 0.0068 
DLEGG_TH(-1)*DCCOUT(-1) -0.238933 0.157534 -1.516712 0.1322 
DCCOUT(-2) -0.220065 0.111210 -1.978833 0.0503 
AR(12) 0.244988 0.137270 1.784718 0.0771 
AR(1) -0.767172 0.046918 -16.35118 0.0000 
MA(2) -0.797472 0.083020 -9.605823 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.511300     Mean dependent var 0.054244 
Adjusted R-squared 0.484644     S.D. dependent var 2.509617 
S.E. of regression 1.801611     Akaike info criterion 4.073204 
Sum squared resid 357.0382     Schwarz criterion 4.238462 
Log likelihood -231.2824     Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.140297 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.073781     Wald F-statistic 2.894170 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.025399    
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Table 9.3: Regression Results (Malaysia) (Continued) 
 
Genesis 
Dependent variable: DGenesis 
 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DCCINF(-2) -1.775738 0.731180 -2.428593 0.0167 
DCCINF(-1) 1.851597 0.746927 2.478953 0.0146 
DGENESIS_TH(-1) 0.109787 0.132647 0.827658 0.4095 
DGENESIS_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) 0.014854 0.208811 0.071137 0.9434 
AR(1) -0.657566 0.120737 -5.446271 0.0000 
AR(2) 0.478521 0.131463 3.639965 0.0004 
AR(3) 0.209268 0.068668 3.047516 0.0028 
MA(2) -0.962211 0.018361 -52.40583 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.343470     Mean dependent var -0.007080 
Adjusted R-squared 0.304524     S.D. dependent var 2.452430 
S.E. of regression 2.045210     Akaike info criterion 4.330264 
Sum squared resid 493.5801     Schwarz criterion 4.510346 
Log likelihood -264.8067     Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.403426 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.001357     Wald F-statistic 1.939893 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.108311    
 
Martin 
Dependent variable: DMartin 
 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DMARTIN_TH(-1) 0.378850 0.161552 2.345064 0.0207 
DMARTIN_TH(-1)*DCCOUT(-1) -0.384360 0.250437 -1.534755 0.1276 
DCCOUT(-2) 0.182524 0.088644 2.059076 0.0417 
AR(2) -0.184276 0.097427 -1.891421 0.0611 
AR(3) 0.452830 0.212387 2.132100 0.0351 
AR(5) -0.143104 0.134479 -1.064139 0.2895 
MA(1) -0.290545 0.207595 -1.399573 0.1643 
MA(3) -0.639266 0.206618 -3.093942 0.0025 
     
     R-squared 0.150511     Mean dependent var 0.129320 
Adjusted R-squared 0.099249     S.D. dependent var 2.170808 
S.E. of regression 2.060269     Akaike info criterion 4.345891 
Sum squared resid 492.3861     Schwarz criterion 4.527845 
Log likelihood -261.4452     Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.419805 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.863463     Wald F-statistic 2.583506 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.056675    
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Table 9.4: Regression Results (Indonesia) 
Aberdeen 
Dependent variable: DAberdeen 
 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DABERDEEN_TH(-1) -0.062312 0.066201 -0.941261 0.3489 
DABERDEEN_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) -0.101145 0.038374 -2.635773 0.0098 
DCCINF(-1) -0.634527 0.230460 -2.753308 0.0070 
DCCINF(-2) 0.547661 0.203196 2.695242 0.0083 
AR(1) -1.047703 0.116130 -9.021842 0.0000 
AR(2) -0.895892 0.150382 -5.957426 0.0000 
AR(3) -0.639741 0.135750 -4.712659 0.0000 
AR(4) -0.238876 0.102335 -2.334257 0.0216 
     
     R-squared 0.576027     Mean dependent var 0.016230 
Adjusted R-squared 0.545431     S.D. dependent var 2.310429 
S.E. of regression 1.557732     Akaike info criterion 3.797470 
Sum squared resid 235.3733     Schwarz criterion 3.999677 
Log likelihood -191.3672     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.879408 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.974182     Wald F-statistic 4.147846 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.003818    
 
 
Acadian 
Dependent variable: DAcadian 
 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DCCINF(-1) 0.206632 0.081467 2.536399 0.0129 
DACADIAN_TH(-1) 0.139682 0.062460 2.236341 0.0277 
DACADIAN_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) -0.029640 0.042277 -0.701072 0.4850 
AR(1) -0.825252 0.049636 -16.62610 0.0000 
AR(15) -0.158428 0.069247 -2.287869 0.0244 
AR(16) -0.269162 0.088461 -3.042725 0.0030 
MA(2) -0.963611 0.023842 -40.41616 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.541884     Mean dependent var -0.003251 
Adjusted R-squared 0.512328     S.D. dependent var 2.281242 
S.E. of regression 1.593071     Akaike info criterion 3.836634 
Sum squared resid 236.0224     Schwarz criterion 4.018996 
Log likelihood -184.8317     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.910439 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.750142     Wald F-statistic 6.213694 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000681    
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Table 9.4: Regression Results (Indonesia) (Continued) 
Baillie 
Dependent variable: DBaillie 
 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DCCINF(-10) -0.485269 0.202380 -2.397810 0.0198 
DCCINF(-3) 0.599573 0.204036 2.938571 0.0048 
DBAILLIE_TH(-1) -0.374628 0.085030 -4.405827 0.0000 
DBAILLIE_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) -0.649158 0.196512 -3.303405 0.0017 
AR(1) -0.403257 0.109840 -3.671329 0.0005 
AR(15) 0.013711 0.066579 0.205933 0.8376 
MA(21) -0.939612 0.027762 -33.84492 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.771803     Mean dependent var 0.021864 
Adjusted R-squared 0.747782     S.D. dependent var 2.596137 
S.E. of regression 1.303814     Akaike info criterion 3.471382 
Sum squared resid 96.89600     Schwarz criterion 3.707510 
Log likelihood -104.0842     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.564405 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.178118     Wald F-statistic 7.296784 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000081    
 
 
Legg 
Dependent variable: DLegg 
 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DCCINF(-6) -0.567889 0.269653 -2.105996 0.0377 
DLEGG_TH(-1) 0.055926 0.072738 0.768867 0.4438 
DLEGG_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) -0.113698 0.088142 -1.289937 0.2001 
DCCINF(-4) 0.375355 0.295792 1.268981 0.2074 
AR(2) -0.516001 0.112465 -4.588083 0.0000 
AR(1) -0.751105 0.101708 -7.384903 0.0000 
AR(3) -0.374120 0.179311 -2.086427 0.0395 
AR(4) -0.300597 0.181815 -1.653312 0.1014 
     
     R-squared 0.479406     Mean dependent var 0.016251 
Adjusted R-squared 0.442596     S.D. dependent var 2.573850 
S.E. of regression 1.921624     Akaike info criterion 4.216042 
Sum squared resid 365.5711     Schwarz criterion 4.415879 
Log likelihood -217.5582     Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.297053 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.027018     Wald F-statistic 1.940227 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.109683    
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Table 9.4: Regression Results (Indonesia) (Continued) 
Genesis 
Dependent variable: DGenesis 
 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DCCINF(-2) -0.652930 0.368233 -1.773145 0.0792 
DCCINF(-1) 0.087220 0.349122 0.249827 0.8032 
DGENESIS_TH(-1) 0.200868 0.124259 1.616525 0.1090 
DGENESIS_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) -0.073191 0.109646 -0.667520 0.5059 
DCCINF(-3) 0.480534 0.277644 1.730754 0.0865 
AR(2) -0.179405 0.082459 -2.175684 0.0319 
AR(1) -0.462214 0.080830 -5.718316 0.0000 
MA(20) -0.018345 0.023869 -0.768550 0.4439 
MA(19) 0.863831 0.032851 26.29504 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.539985     Mean dependent var -0.078612 
Adjusted R-squared 0.504256     S.D. dependent var 3.189701 
S.E. of regression 2.245840     Akaike info criterion 4.532981 
Sum squared resid 519.5112     Schwarz criterion 4.751432 
Log likelihood -244.8469     Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.621613 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.994713     Wald F-statistic 1.690624 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.143444    
 
 
Martin 
Dependent variable: DMartin 
 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DCCINF(-1) 0.272971 0.091085 2.996901 0.0035 
DCCINF(-12) -0.180302 0.131377 -1.372400 0.1732 
DMARTIN_TH(-1) 0.014871 0.026187 0.567877 0.5715 
DMARTIN_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) 0.243807 0.116089 2.100162 0.0384 
AR(2) -0.985718 0.030481 -32.33888 0.0000 
AR(1) -0.977462 0.024432 -40.00799 0.0000 
AR(3) -0.930336 0.033415 -27.84225 0.0000 
MA(4) -0.999892 0.023538 -42.47928 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.601309     Mean dependent var -0.002080 
Adjusted R-squared 0.571620     S.D. dependent var 2.329817 
S.E. of regression 1.524884     Akaike info criterion 3.756898 
Sum squared resid 218.5754     Schwarz criterion 3.962778 
Log likelihood -183.6018     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.840266 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.943959     Wald F-statistic 18.04717 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 9.5: Regression Results (Philippines) 
 
Aberdeen 
Dependent variable: DAberdeen 
 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DCCINF(-5) -0.176918 0.091615 -1.931113 0.0560 
DABERDEEN_TH(-1) 0.009406 0.048129 0.195429 0.8454 
DABERDEEN_TH*DCCINF(-1) -0.177888 0.107210 -1.659246 0.0999 
AR(12) -0.172548 0.081669 -2.112779 0.0369 
AR(4) -0.155496 0.081917 -1.898211 0.0603 
MA(1) -0.851618 0.054715 -15.56454 0.0000 
MA(8) -0.120126 0.057737 -2.080574 0.0398 
     
     R-squared 0.467407     Mean dependent var 0.004963 
Adjusted R-squared 0.438356     S.D. dependent var 1.341476 
S.E. of regression 1.005341     Akaike info criterion 2.906496 
Sum squared resid 111.1782     Schwarz criterion 3.071754 
Log likelihood -163.0300     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.973588 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.014969     Wald F-statistic 1.939080 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.127474    
 
 
Acadian 
Dependent variable: DAcadian 
 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DCCINF(-1) -0.283534 0.130711 -2.169163 0.0325 
DCCINF(-2) 0.291133 0.156946 1.854990 0.0667 
DACADIAN_TH(-1) 0.024630 0.026063 0.945012 0.3470 
DACADIAN_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) 0.227686 0.097683 2.330869 0.0219 
AR(3) -0.224027 0.085425 -2.622494 0.0102 
AR(1) -0.545958 0.073357 -7.442480 0.0000 
AR(2) -0.540101 0.070629 -7.647021 0.0000 
AR(6) 0.137665 0.070883 1.942145 0.0551 
AR(19) -0.230303 0.069150 -3.330479 0.0012 
AR(22) 0.312126 0.061056 5.112136 0.0000 
MA(19) 0.868619 0.032122 27.04155 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.601555     Mean dependent var 0.008411 
Adjusted R-squared 0.560051     S.D. dependent var 1.027873 
S.E. of regression 0.681775     Akaike info criterion 2.168892 
Sum squared resid 44.62241     Schwarz criterion 2.443669 
Log likelihood -105.0357     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.280283 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.066199     Wald F-statistic 2.232699 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.071121    
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Table 9.5: Regression Results (Philippines) (Continued) 
 
Baillie 
Dependent variable: DBaillie 
 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DCCINF(-5) 0.307627 0.085237 3.609093 0.0006 
DCCINF(-2) -0.209549 0.111734 -1.875426 0.0648 
DBAILLIE_TH(-1) 0.012964 0.046621 0.278061 0.7818 
DBAILLIE_TH(-1)*DCCINF_TH(-1) -0.006716 0.049952 -0.134455 0.8934 
AR(3) -0.304874 0.087348 -3.490330 0.0008 
AR(19) -0.150617 0.088673 -1.698574 0.0938 
AR(1) -0.270734 0.108082 -2.504895 0.0145 
AR(2) -0.215113 0.087384 -2.461685 0.0163 
AR(5) -0.335296 0.140565 -2.385341 0.0197 
MA(1) -0.489634 0.071523 -6.845780 0.0000 
MA(19) 0.380475 0.073336 5.188100 0.0000 
MA(20) -0.890636 0.033056 -26.94365 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.721242     Mean dependent var -0.018313 
Adjusted R-squared 0.678054     S.D. dependent var 0.990487 
S.E. of regression 0.562006     Akaike info criterion 1.818386 
Sum squared resid 22.42538     Schwarz criterion 2.168098 
Log likelihood -63.46303     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.958881 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.291803     Wald F-statistic 5.733192 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000468    
 
 
Legg 
Dependent variable: DLegg 
 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DCCINF(-10) -0.156897 0.087944 -1.784051 0.0770 
DCCINF(-1) -0.230502 0.080700 -2.856267 0.0051 
DLEGG_TH(-1) -0.056209 0.047648 -1.179655 0.2405 
DLEGG_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) 0.056780 0.030046 1.889763 0.0612 
AR(4) -0.134297 0.099070 -1.355576 0.1778 
MA(1) -1.026855 0.013519 -75.95662 0.0000 
MA(19) 0.035181 0.008127 4.328929 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.454314     Mean dependent var -0.006720 
Adjusted R-squared 0.426567     S.D. dependent var 1.102006 
S.E. of regression 0.834498     Akaike info criterion 2.530398 
Sum squared resid 82.17367     Schwarz criterion 2.688784 
Log likelihood -151.1499     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.594742 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.779730     Wald F-statistic 9.682734 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000001    
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Table 9.5: Regression Results (Philippines) (Continued) 
 
Genesis 
Dependent variable: DGenesis 
 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DCCINF(-5) -0.521697 0.138161 -3.776014 0.0003 
DCCINF(-3) 0.451540 0.122669 3.680949 0.0004 
DGENESIS_TH(-1) 0.177757 0.052431 3.390273 0.0010 
DGENESIS_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) 0.089212 0.050060 1.782094 0.0777 
AR(19) 0.414247 0.137473 3.013285 0.0033 
AR(2) -0.181778 0.066360 -2.739265 0.0073 
MA(1) -0.821018 0.025445 -32.26687 0.0000 
MA(19) -0.699568 0.047474 -14.73591 0.0000 
MA(20) 0.813557 0.039120 20.79643 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.544548     Mean dependent var 0.042909 
Adjusted R-squared 0.508473     S.D. dependent var 1.287296 
S.E. of regression 0.902511     Akaike info criterion 2.711004 
Sum squared resid 82.26710     Schwarz criterion 2.931953 
Log likelihood -140.1052     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.800622 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.174642     Wald F-statistic 5.065444 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000923    
     
     
 
 
Martin 
Dependent variable: DMartin 
 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DCCINF(-9) -0.233471 0.134810 -1.731856 0.0861 
DMARTIN_TH(-1) 0.068045 0.051287 1.326741 0.1873 
DMARTIN_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) -0.075895 0.037683 -2.014011 0.0464 
DCCINF(-5) 0.103303 0.116961 0.883224 0.3790 
AR(3) -0.126810 0.081998 -1.546508 0.1248 
AR(9) 0.032047 0.077863 0.411579 0.6814 
MA(1) -0.897126 0.124100 -7.229058 0.0000 
MA(2) -0.079285 0.124678 -0.635917 0.5261 
     
     R-squared 0.491332     Mean dependent var 0.014419 
Adjusted R-squared 0.459540     S.D. dependent var 1.042290 
S.E. of regression 0.766250     Akaike info criterion 2.369723 
Sum squared resid 65.75952     Schwarz criterion 2.555556 
Log likelihood -134.1834     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.445191 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.949749     Wald F-statistic 4.459058 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.002214    
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Table 9.6: Regression Results (Taiwan) 
 
Aberdeen 
Dependent variable: DAberdeen 
 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DCCINF(-2) 0.259264 0.144109 1.799089 0.0746 
DCCINF(-4) -0.314416 0.166106 -1.892860 0.0608 
DABERDEEN_TH(-1) 0.077169 0.051598 1.495601 0.1374 
DABERDEEN_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) -0.089575 0.019759 -4.533367 0.0000 
AR(1) 0.208750 0.089586 2.330156 0.0215 
AR(3) 0.107321 0.089805 1.195034 0.2345 
MA(1) -1.109901 0.010701 -103.7146 0.0000 
MA(8) 0.114436 0.008850 12.93050 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.442791     Mean dependent var 0.016905 
Adjusted R-squared 0.409736     S.D. dependent var 1.312769 
S.E. of regression 1.008582     Akaike info criterion 2.916355 
Sum squared resid 120.0341     Schwarz criterion 3.096436 
Log likelihood -175.7304     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.989516 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.045457     Wald F-statistic 8.247294 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000007    
 
 
Acadian 
Dependent variable: DAcadian 
 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DCCINF(-3) 0.157964 0.110115 1.434538 0.1542 
DCCINF(-8) -0.245122 0.109714 -2.234196 0.0274 
DACADIAN_TH(-1) 0.034351 0.035582 0.965405 0.3364 
DACADIAN_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) 0.009424 0.116011 0.081230 0.9354 
AR(7) -0.133884 0.059914 -2.234593 0.0274 
AR(2) -0.288803 0.088640 -3.258160 0.0015 
AR(1) -0.203694 0.125805 -1.619120 0.1082 
MA(1) -0.682624 0.058783 -11.61267 0.0000 
MA(8) -0.317343 0.077365 -4.101882 0.0001 
     
     R-squared 0.512522     Mean dependent var -0.027623 
Adjusted R-squared 0.478010     S.D. dependent var 1.119942 
S.E. of regression 0.809145     Akaike info criterion 2.485231 
Sum squared resid 73.98288     Schwarz criterion 2.692085 
Log likelihood -142.5991     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.569248 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.012617     Wald F-statistic 1.840669 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.125922    
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Table 9.6: Regression Results (Taiwan) (Continued) 
 
Baillie 
Dependent variable: DBaillie 
 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DCCINF(-3) 0.070483 0.154458 0.456324 0.6490 
DCCINF(-1) -0.290743 0.118863 -2.446042 0.0159 
DBAILLIE_TH(-1) -0.042437 0.039103 -1.085261 0.2799 
DBAILLIE_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) 0.054673 0.144559 0.378207 0.7059 
AR(7) 0.075351 0.174363 0.432149 0.6664 
MA(1) -0.897921 0.045236 -19.84981 0.0000 
MA(8) 0.231294 0.115503 2.002494 0.0474 
MA(12) -0.171080 0.065943 -2.594346 0.0106 
MA(6) -0.162230 0.113127 -1.434052 0.1541 
     
     R-squared 0.432220     Mean dependent var 0.019847 
Adjusted R-squared 0.394989     S.D. dependent var 1.136821 
S.E. of regression 0.884247     Akaike info criterion 2.658068 
Sum squared resid 95.39096     Schwarz criterion 2.855601 
Log likelihood -165.1035     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.738334 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.928773     Wald F-statistic 7.615302 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000016    
 
 
Legg 
Dependent variable: DLegg 
 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DCCINF(-4) -0.203114 0.117421 -1.729786 0.0865 
DLEGG_TH(-1) -0.042277 0.045564 -0.927876 0.3555 
DLEGG_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) 0.073868 0.036601 2.018174 0.0460 
DCCINF(-1) -0.190625 0.115881 -1.645003 0.1028 
AR(1) -0.427146 0.120621 -3.541220 0.0006 
AR(10) 0.064354 0.102092 0.630351 0.5298 
MA(1) -0.586788 0.168570 -3.480975 0.0007 
MA(2) -0.553121 0.169007 -3.272759 0.0014 
MA(12) 0.140486 0.057789 2.431043 0.0167 
     
     R-squared 0.497290     Mean dependent var -0.010084 
Adjusted R-squared 0.460730     S.D. dependent var 1.125293 
S.E. of regression 0.826360     Akaike info criterion 2.529044 
Sum squared resid 75.11570     Schwarz criterion 2.739230 
Log likelihood -141.4781     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.614394 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.849264     Wald F-statistic 49.39940 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 9.6: Regression Results (Taiwan) (Continued) 
 
Genesis 
Dependent variable: DGenesis 
 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DCCINF(-5) -0.370475 0.170359 -2.174673 0.0316 
DCCINF(-3) 0.284469 0.168445 1.688795 0.0938 
DGENESIS_TH(-1) 0.068992 0.049152 1.403628 0.1630 
DGENESIS_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) 0.071148 0.036944 1.925821 0.0565 
AR(1) -0.856157 0.086043 -9.950332 0.0000 
MA(2) -0.916652 0.055386 -16.55018 0.0000 
MA(3) -0.040348 0.053858 -0.749145 0.4552 
     
     R-squared 0.509192     Mean dependent var 0.031456 
Adjusted R-squared 0.484855     S.D. dependent var 1.299786 
S.E. of regression 0.932903     Akaike info criterion 2.752105 
Sum squared resid 105.3073     Schwarz criterion 2.908075 
Log likelihood -169.1347     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.815476 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.097025     Wald F-statistic 5.089402 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000797    
 
 
Martin 
Dependent variable: DMartin 
 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DCCINF(-2) 0.366756 0.174460 2.102233 0.0376 
DCCINF(-3) -0.411264 0.163118 -2.521261 0.0130 
DMARTIN_TH(-1) 0.093443 0.053965 1.731541 0.0859 
DMARTIN_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) -0.106539 0.043300 -2.460483 0.0153 
AR(1) -0.786350 0.068321 -11.50966 0.0000 
AR(2) -0.566686 0.127584 -4.441664 0.0000 
MA(2) -0.177196 0.096195 -1.842047 0.0680 
MA(3) -0.767629 0.097279 -7.890960 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.496139     Mean dependent var 0.027263 
Adjusted R-squared 0.466501     S.D. dependent var 1.088558 
S.E. of regression 0.795094     Akaike info criterion 2.440208 
Sum squared resid 75.22875     Schwarz criterion 2.619369 
Log likelihood -146.9532     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.512999 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.943891     Wald F-statistic 5.085195 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000810    
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Table 10.1: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results (Korea) 
 
System: SUR   
Estimation Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Iterate coefficients after one-step weighting matrix 
Convergence achieved after: 1 weight matrix, 21 total coef iterations 
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
DCCOUTF(-2) 1.652 0.732 2.257 0.024 
DCCOUTF(-3) -2.065 0.745 -2.772 0.006 
DABERDEEN_TH(-1) 0.031 0.237 0.131 0.896 
DABERDEEN_TH(-
1)*DCCOUTF(-1) 0.306 0.379 0.807 0.420 
DCCINF(-11) 0.207 0.647 0.320 0.749 
AR(1) -0.457 0.086 -5.342 0.000 
AR(2) -0.125 0.084 -1.494 0.136 
DCCINF(-4) 0.164 0.562 0.292 0.770 
DGENESIS_TH(-1) -0.134 0.167 -0.802 0.423 
AR(17) 0.191 0.076 2.525 0.012 
AR(6) -0.141 0.081 -1.757 0.079 
AR(2) -0.219 0.087 -2.528 0.012 
AR(3) -0.037 0.087 -0.419 0.675 
DCCINF(-2) 0.332 0.346 0.962 0.337 
DBAILLIE_TH(-1) 0.229 0.235 0.974 0.331 
DBAILLIE_TH 
(-1)*DCCINF(-1) 0.505 0.381 1.327 0.185 
AR(1) -0.935 0.107 -8.703 0.000 
AR(2) -0.757 0.144 -5.262 0.000 
AR(3) -0.266 0.148 -1.797 0.073 
AR(21) -0.192 0.067 -2.875 0.004 
AR(4) -0.071 0.107 -0.660 0.509 
DCCINF(-5) -0.106 0.308 -0.344 0.731 
DCCINF(-1) -0.105 0.321 -0.326 0.745 
DCCINF(-2) 0.173 0.318 0.545 0.586 
DACADIAN_TH(-1) 0.002 0.070 0.030 0.976 
DACADIAN_TH(-
1)*DCCINF(-1) 
0.081 0.127 0.640 0.522 
AR(3) 0.046 0.089 0.518 0.605 
DCCINF(-1) -0.655 0.482 -1.359 0.175 
DCCINF(-6) 0.786 0.484 1.624 0.105 
 105 
DLEGG_TH(-1) 0.173 0.156 1.109 0.268 
DLEGG_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) 0.980 0.321 3.050 0.002 
AR(1) -0.445 0.075 -5.902 0.000 
DCCOUTF(-1) 1.590 0.561 2.834 0.005 
DMARTIN_TH(-1) -0.202 0.200 -1.007 0.314 
DMARTIN_TH 
(-1)*DCCOUTF(-1) -0.897 0.279 -3.217 0.001 
DCCOUTF(-2) -0.709 0.566 -1.252 0.211 
AR(20) 0.105 0.090 1.164 0.245 
     
     Determinant residual covariance 3188501.   
     
          
Equation: DABERDEEN = C(1)*DCCOUTF(-2) + C(2)*DCCOUTF(-3) + 
        C(3)*DABERDEEN_TH(-1) + C(4)*DABERDEEN_TH(-1) 
        *DCCOUTF(-1) + C(5)*DCCINF(-11) + [AR(1)=C(6),AR(2)=C(7),BAC 
        KCAST=2003M05,ESTSMPL="2003M05 2013M11"] 
Observations: 127   
R-squared 0.266597     Mean dependent var -0.222372 
Adjusted R-squared 0.229927     S.D. dependent var 5.650471 
S.E. of regression 4.958504     Sum squared resid 2950.411 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.079031    
     
Equation: DGENESIS = C(8)*DCCINF(-4) + C(9)*DGENESIS_TH(-1) + 
        [AR(17)=C(10),AR(6)=C(11),AR(2)=C(12),AR(3)=C(13),BACKCAST 
        =2004M08,ESTSMPL="2004M08 2013M11"] 
Observations: 112   
R-squared 0.123998     Mean dependent var -0.033828 
Adjusted R-squared 0.082677     S.D. dependent var 4.310987 
S.E. of regression 4.128932     Sum squared resid 1807.097 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.588268    
     
Equation: DBAILLIE = C(14)*DCCINF(-2) + C(15)*DBAILLIE_TH(-1) + 
        C(16)*DBAILLIE_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) + [AR(1)=C(17),AR(2)=C(18),A 
        R(3)=C(19),AR(21)=C(20),AR(4)=C(21),BACKCAST=2004M12,EST 
        SMPL="2004M12 2011M08"]  
Observations: 81   
R-squared 0.550647     Mean dependent var 0.107407 
Adjusted R-squared 0.507558     S.D. dependent var 5.737890 
S.E. of regression 4.026518     Sum squared resid 1183.538 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.873529    
     
Equation: DACADIAN = C(22)*DCCINF(-5) + C(23)*DCCINF(-1) + C(24) 
        *DCCINF(-2) + C(25)*DACADIAN_TH(-1) + C(26)*DACADIAN_TH( 
        -1)*DCCINF(-1) + [AR(3)=C(27),BACKCAST=2003M06,ESTSMPL=" 
        2003M06 2013M11"]  
Observations: 126   
R-squared 0.005638     Mean dependent var -0.018016 
Adjusted R-squared -0.035794     S.D. dependent var 1.942396 
S.E. of regression 1.976854     Sum squared resid 468.9541 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.841321    
     
Table 10.1: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results (Korea) (Continued) 
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Equation: DLEGG = C(28)*DCCINF(-1) + C(29)*DCCINF(-6) + C(30) 
        *DLEGG_TH(-1) + C(31)*DLEGG_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) + 
        [AR(1)=C(32),BACKCAST=2003M04,ESTSMPL="2003M04 
        2013M11"]   
Observations: 128   
R-squared 0.272308     Mean dependent var -0.075781 
Adjusted R-squared 0.248643     S.D. dependent var 4.262797 
S.E. of regression 3.695029     Sum squared resid 1679.349 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.152637    
     
Equation: DMARTIN = C(33)*DCCOUTF(-1) + C(34)*DMARTIN_TH(-1) + 
        C(35)*DMARTIN_TH(-1)*DCCOUTF(-1) + C(36)*DCCOUTF(-2) + 
        [AR(20)=C(37),BACKCAST=2004M11,ESTSMPL="2004M11 
        2013M11"]   
Observations: 109   
R-squared 0.141212     Mean dependent var -0.100000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.108182     S.D. dependent var 4.032886 
S.E. of regression 3.808501     Sum squared resid 1508.487 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.391649    
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Table 10.2: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results (Malaysia) 
 
 
System: SUR   
Estimation Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Iterate coefficients after one-step weighting matrix 
Convergence achieved after: 1 weight matrix, 16 total coef iterations 
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
DCCINF(-6) -0.687 0.321 -2.139 0.033 
DCCOUTF(-4) 0.442 0.340 1.299 0.194 
DABERDEEN_TH(-1) 0.016 0.116 0.135 0.893 
DABERDEEN_TH(-
1)*DCCOUTF(-1) -0.061 0.248 -0.245 0.806 
AR(1) -0.352 0.075 -4.725 0.000 
DCC(-2) -0.549 0.280 -1.962 0.050 
DCC(-3) 0.564 0.268 2.104 0.036 
DACADIAN_TH(-1) 0.109 0.088 1.238 0.216 
DACADIAN_TH(-
1)*DCC(-1) 0.100 0.097 1.030 0.304 
AR(1) -0.518 0.088 -5.881 0.000 
AR(2) -0.232 0.100 -2.328 0.020 
AR(3) -0.199 0.093 -2.149 0.032 
DCCINF(-6) 0.687 0.309 2.223 0.027 
DBAILLIE_TH(-1) -0.055 0.082 -0.670 0.503 
DBAILLIE_TH(-
1)*DCCINF(-1) 0.129 0.158 0.815 0.415 
DCCINF(-7) 0.711 0.309 2.301 0.022 
AR(1) 0.492 0.075 6.547 0.000 
AR(2) 0.389 0.077 5.038 0.000 
DCCINF(-2) -1.935 0.450 -4.304 0.000 
DCCINF(-1) 2.047 0.453 4.519 0.000 
DGENESIS_TH(-1) 0.190 0.109 1.736 0.083 
DGENESIS_TH(-
1)*DCCINF(-1) 0.239 0.242 0.990 0.323 
AR(1) -0.600 0.093 -6.479 0.000 
AR(2) -0.315 0.104 -3.027 0.003 
AR(3) -0.046 0.092 -0.495 0.621 
DCCOUTF(-8) 0.154 0.316 0.487 0.627 
DLEGG_TH(-1) 0.239 0.095 2.521 0.012 
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DLEGG_TH(-
1)*DCCOUTF(-1) -0.516 0.301 -1.713 0.087 
DCCOUTF(-2) -0.241 0.328 -0.736 0.462 
AR(12) 0.295 0.096 3.063 0.002 
AR(1) -0.486 0.078 -6.266 0.000 
DMARTIN_TH(-1) 0.305 0.115 2.659 0.008 
DMARTIN_TH(-
1)*DCCOUTF(-1) -0.267 0.269 -0.992 0.322 
DCCOUTF(-2) -0.080 0.393 -0.204 0.838 
AR(2) -0.103 0.092 -1.111 0.267 
AR(3) 0.003 0.099 0.028 0.978 
AR(5) -0.046 0.098 -0.469 0.639 
     
     Determinant residual covariance 3155.514   
     
          
Equation: DABERDEEN = C(1)*DCCINF(-6) + C(2)*DCCOUTF(-4) + C(3) 
        *DABERDEEN_TH(-1) + C(4)*DABERDEEN_TH(-1)*DCCOUTF(-1)  
        + [AR(1)=C(5),BACKCAST=2000M08,ESTSMPL="2000M08 
        2013M11"]   
Observations: 160   
R-squared 0.139497     Mean dependent var 0.090686 
Adjusted R-squared 0.117290     S.D. dependent var 2.323252 
S.E. of regression 2.182757     Sum squared resid 738.4862 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.931849    
     
Equation: DACADIAN = C(6)*DCC(-2) + C(7)*DCC(-3) + C(8) 
        *DACADIAN_TH(-1) + C(9)*DACADIAN_TH(-1)*DCC(-1) + 
        [AR(1)=C(10),AR(2)=C(11),AR(3)=C(12),BACKCAST=2003M06,EST 
        SMPL="2003M06 2013M11"]  
Observations: 126   
R-squared 0.201665     Mean dependent var 0.052937 
Adjusted R-squared 0.161413     S.D. dependent var 2.065939 
S.E. of regression 1.891872     Sum squared resid 425.9221 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.036151    
     
Equation: DBAILLIE = C(13)*DCCINF(-6) + C(14)*DBAILLIE_TH(-1) + 
        C(15)*DBAILLIE_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) + C(16)*DCCINF(-7) + 
        [AR(1)=C(17),AR(2)=C(18),BACKCAST=2000M10,ESTSMPL="2000 
        M10 2013M11"]   
Observations: 158   
R-squared 0.097943     Mean dependent var 2.553164 
Adjusted R-squared 0.068270     S.D. dependent var 1.782813 
S.E. of regression 1.720881     Sum squared resid 450.1375 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.138886    
     
Equation: DGENESIS = C(19)*DCCINF(-2) + C(20)*DCCINF(-1) + C(21) 
        *DGENESIS_TH(-1) + C(22)*DGENESIS_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) + 
        [AR(1)=C(23),AR(2)=C(24),AR(3)=C(25),BACKCAST=2003M06,EST 
        SMPL="2003M06 2013M11"]  
Observations: 126   
Table 10.2: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results (Malaysia) (Continued) 
 
 109 
R-squared 0.267221     Mean dependent var -0.007080 
Adjusted R-squared 0.230274     S.D. dependent var 2.452430 
S.E. of regression 2.151616     Sum squared resid 550.9047 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.994045    
     
Equation: DLEGG = C(26)*DCCOUTF(-8) + C(27)*DLEGG_TH(-1) + 
        C(28)*DLEGG_TH(-1)*DCCOUTF(-1) + C(29)*DCCOUTF(-2) + 
        [AR(12)=C(30),AR(1)=C(31),BACKCAST=2004M03,ESTSMPL="200 
        4M03 2013M11"]  
Observations: 117   
R-squared 0.285440     Mean dependent var 0.054244 
Adjusted R-squared 0.253253     S.D. dependent var 2.509617 
S.E. of regression 2.168673     Sum squared resid 522.0489 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.321982    
     
Equation: DMARTIN = C(32)*DMARTIN_TH(-1) + C(33)*DMARTIN_TH( 
        -1)*DCCOUTF(-1) + C(34)*DCCOUTF(-2) + [AR(2)=C(35),AR(3)=C( 
        36),AR(5)=C(37),BACKCAST=2003M08,ESTSMPL="2003M08 
        2013M11"]   
Observations: 124   
R-squared 0.047892     Mean dependent var 0.129320 
Adjusted R-squared 0.007549     S.D. dependent var 2.170808 
S.E. of regression 2.162600     Sum squared resid 551.8668 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.288654    
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10.2: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results (Malaysia) (Continued) 
 
 110 
Table 10.3: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results (Philippines) 
 
 
System: SUR_NEW   
Estimation Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Iterate coefficients after one-step weighting matrix 
Convergence achieved after: 1 weight matrix, 29 total coef iterations 
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
DCCINF(-5) 0.118 0.317 0.371 0.711 
DABERDEEN_TH(-
1) 0.059 0.069 0.855 0.393 
DABERDEEN_TH(-1) -0.168 0.197 -0.856 0.393 
AR(19) -0.112 0.114 -0.977 0.329 
DCCINF(-10) -0.281 0.239 -1.178 0.239 
DCCINF(-1) -0.489 0.280 -1.743 0.082 
DLEGG_TH(-1) -0.004 0.045 -0.094 0.925 
DLEGG_TH(-
1)*DCCINF(-1) 0.106 0.091 1.161 0.246 
AR(4) -0.026 0.093 -0.276 0.783 
DCCINF(-5) -0.740 0.277 -2.672 0.008 
DCCINF(-3) 0.288 0.276 1.045 0.297 
DGENESIS_TH(-1) 0.018 0.056 0.320 0.749 
DGENESIS_TH(-
1)*DCCINF(-1) 0.165 0.132 1.248 0.213 
AR(19) -0.062 0.099 -0.621 0.535 
AR(2) -0.180 0.094 -1.904 0.057 
DCCINF(-1) -0.135 0.183 -0.740 0.459 
DCCINF(-2) 0.141 0.182 0.774 0.439 
DACADIAN_TH(-1) 0.022 0.037 0.614 0.539 
DACADIAN_TH(-
1)*DCCINF(-1) 0.039 0.114 0.347 0.729 
AR(3) -0.279 0.096 -2.919 0.004 
AR(1) -0.639 0.089 -7.155 0.000 
AR(2) -0.537 0.097 -5.510 0.000 
AR(6) 0.071 0.077 0.921 0.358 
AR(19) 0.046 0.069 0.661 0.509 
AR(22) 0.237 0.063 3.768 0.000 
DCCINF(-5) 0.238 0.312 0.764 0.445 
DCCINF(-2) -0.024 0.301 -0.080 0.936 
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DBAILLIE_TH(-1) -0.019 0.066 -0.284 0.777 
DBAILLIE_TH(-
1)*DCCINF_TH(-1) 0.042 0.143 0.292 0.770 
AR(3) -0.070 0.132 -0.532 0.595 
AR(19) 0.098 0.120 0.819 0.413 
AR(2) -0.083 0.136 -0.607 0.544 
AR(5) -0.132 0.125 -1.053 0.293 
DCCINF(-9) -0.139 0.228 -0.612 0.541 
DMARTIN_TH(-1) 0.041 0.058 0.701 0.483 
DMARTIN_TH(-
1)*DCCINF(-1) -0.101 0.137 -0.736 0.462 
AR(3) -0.154 0.091 -1.704 0.089 
     
     Determinant residual covariance 1.220300   
     
          
Equation: DABERDEEN = C(1)*DCCINF(-5) + C(2)*DABERDEEN_TH(-1) 
        + C(3)*DABERDEEN_TH*DCCINF(-1) + [AR(19)=C(4),BACKCAST= 
        2006M02,ESTSMPL="2006M02 2013M11"] 
Observations: 94   
R-squared 0.032372     Mean dependent var 0.037340 
Adjusted R-squared 0.000118     S.D. dependent var 1.364403 
S.E. of regression 1.364323     Sum squared resid 167.5239 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.980240    
     
Equation: DLEGG = C(5)*DCCINF(-10) + C(6)*DCCINF(-1) + C(7) 
        *DLEGG_TH(-1) + C(8)*DLEGG_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) + 
        [AR(4)=C(9),BACKCAST=2003M07,ESTSMPL="2003M07 
        2013M11"]   
Observations: 125   
R-squared 0.031674     Mean dependent var -0.006720 
Adjusted R-squared -0.000603     S.D. dependent var 1.102007 
S.E. of regression 1.102339     Sum squared resid 145.8181 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.585837    
     
Equation: DGENESIS = C(10)*DCCINF(-5) + C(11)*DCCINF(-3) + C(12) 
        *DGENESIS_TH(-1) + C(13)*DGENESIS_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) + 
        [AR(19)=C(14),AR(2)=C(15),BACKCAST=2004M10,ESTSMPL="200 
        4M10 2013M11"]  
Observations: 110   
R-squared 0.093832     Mean dependent var 0.042909 
Adjusted R-squared 0.050266     S.D. dependent var 1.287296 
S.E. of regression 1.254526     Sum squared resid 163.6788 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.904717    
     
Equation: DACADIAN = C(16)*DCCINF(-1) + C(17)*DCCINF(-2) + C(18) 
        *DACADIAN_TH(-1) + C(19)*DACADIAN_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) + 
        [AR(3)=C(20),AR(1)=C(21),AR(2)=C(22),AR(6)=C(23),AR(19)=C(24) 
        ,AR(22)=C(25),BACKCAST=2005M01,ESTSMPL="2005M01 
        2013M11"]   
Observations: 107   
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R-squared 0.448028     Mean dependent var 0.008411 
Adjusted R-squared 0.396814     S.D. dependent var 1.027873 
S.E. of regression 0.798298     Sum squared resid 61.81617 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.982654    
     
Equation: DBAILLIE = C(26)*DCCINF(-5) + C(27)*DCCINF(-2) + C(28) 
        *DBAILLIE_TH(-1) + C(29)*DBAILLIE_TH(-1)*DCCINF_TH(-1) + 
        [AR(3)=C(30),AR(19)=C(31),AR(32)=C(7),AR(2)=C(33),AR(5)=C(34) 
        ,BACKCAST=2004M10,ESTSMPL="2004M10 2011M08"] 
Observations: 70   
R-squared 0.016733     Mean dependent var -0.020223 
Adjusted R-squared -0.112220     S.D. dependent var 0.903666 
S.E. of regression 0.953023     Sum squared resid 55.40340 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.866056    
     
Equation: DMARTIN = C(35)*DCCINF(-9) + C(36)*DMARTIN_TH(-1) + 
        C(37)*DMARTIN_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) + [AR(3)=C(38),BACKCAST=2 
        003M06,ESTSMPL="2003M06 2013M11"] 
Observations: 126   
R-squared 0.036052     Mean dependent var 0.012002 
Adjusted R-squared 0.012348     S.D. dependent var 1.079176 
S.E. of regression 1.072492     Sum squared resid 140.3293 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.757457    
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Table 10.4: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results (Taiwan) 
 
System: SUR1   
Estimation Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Iterate coefficients after one-step weighting matrix 
Convergence achieved after: 1 weight matrix, 15 total coef iterations 
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
DCCINF(-2) 0.128 0.211 0.607 0.544 
DCCINF(-4) -0.301 0.206 -1.458 0.145 
DABERDEEN_TH(-1) 0.026 0.051 0.501 0.617 
DABERDEEN_TH(-
1)*DCCINF(-1) 0.058 0.132 0.440 0.660 
AR(1) -0.538 0.075 -7.165 0.000 
AR(3) 0.070 0.077 0.920 0.358 
DCCINF(-3) 0.100 0.154 0.651 0.515 
DCCINF(-8) -0.161 0.144 -1.116 0.265 
DACADIAN_TH(-1) 0.035 0.038 0.924 0.356 
DACADIAN_TH(-
1)*DCCINF(-1) -0.036 0.123 -0.295 0.768 
AR(7) 0.023 0.067 0.337 0.736 
AR(2) -0.456 0.074 -6.136 0.000 
AR(1) -0.640 0.076 -8.461 0.000 
DCCINF(-3) 0.109 0.281 0.386 0.699 
DCCINF(-1) -0.360 0.274 -1.314 0.189 
DBAILLIE_TH(-1) -0.023 0.070 -0.334 0.738 
DBAILLIE_TH(-
1)*DCCINF(-1) -0.140 0.298 -0.469 0.639 
AR(7) 0.073 0.070 1.036 0.301 
DCCINF(-5) -0.562 0.215 -2.621 0.009 
DCCINF(-3) 0.251 0.218 1.153 0.250 
DGENESIS_TH(-1) 0.033 0.052 0.634 0.527 
DGENESIS_TH(-
1)*DCCINF(-1) 0.147 0.097 1.525 0.128 
AR(1) -0.430 0.077 -5.580 0.000 
DCCINF(-2) 0.015 0.202 0.073 0.942 
DCCINF(-4) -0.101 0.198 -0.507 0.612 
DLEGG_TH(-1) -0.052 0.050 -1.037 0.300 
DLEGG_TH(-
1)*DCCINF(-1) -0.034 0.069 -0.489 0.625 
AR(1) -0.440 0.084 -5.207 0.000 
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AR(3) 0.035 0.087 0.402 0.688 
DCCINF(-2) 0.182 0.207 0.880 0.379 
DCCINF(-3) -0.480 0.203 -2.369 0.018 
DMARTIN_TH(-1) 0.041 0.059 0.701 0.483 
DMARTIN_TH(-
1)*DCCINF(-1) 0.006 0.107 0.052 0.959 
AR(1) -0.544 0.085 -6.365 0.000 
AR(2) -0.241 0.085 -2.845 0.005 
     
     Determinant residual covariance 1.389302   
     
          
Equation: DABERDEEN = C(1)*DCCINF(-2) + C(2)*DCCINF(-4) + C(3) 
        *DABERDEEN_TH(-1) + C(4)*DABERDEEN_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) + 
        [AR(1)=C(5),AR(3)=C(6),BACKCAST=2003M06,ESTSMPL="2003M 
        06 2013M11"]   
Observations: 126   
R-squared 0.276747     Mean dependent var 0.016905 
Adjusted R-squared 0.246611     S.D. dependent var 1.312769 
S.E. of regression 1.139457     Sum squared resid 155.8034 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.189467    
     
Equation: DACADIAN = C(7)*DCCINF(-3) + C(8)*DCCINF(-8) + C(9) 
        *DACADIAN_TH(-1) + C(10)*DACADIAN_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) + 
        [AR(7)=C(11),AR(2)=C(12),AR(1)=C(13),BACKCAST=2003M10,EST 
        SMPL="2003M10 2013M11"]  
Observations: 122   
R-squared 0.403344     Mean dependent var -0.027623 
Adjusted R-squared 0.372214     S.D. dependent var 1.119942 
S.E. of regression 0.887363     Sum squared resid 90.55252 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.157347    
     
Equation: DBAILLIE = C(14)*DCCINF(-3) + C(15)*DCCINF(-1) + C(16) 
        *DBAILLIE_TH(-1) + C(17)*DBAILLIE_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) + 
        [AR(7)=C(18),BACKCAST=2003M01,ESTSMPL="2003M01 
        2013M11"]   
Observations: 156   
R-squared 0.020299     Mean dependent var 0.016667 
Adjusted R-squared -0.005653     S.D. dependent var 1.334295 
S.E. of regression 1.338061     Sum squared resid 270.3515 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.698510    
     
Equation: DGENESIS = C(19)*DCCINF(-5) + C(20)*DCCINF(-3) + C(21) 
        *DGENESIS_TH(-1) + C(22)*DGENESIS_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) + 
        [AR(1)=C(23),BACKCAST=2003M04,ESTSMPL="2003M04 
        2013M11"]   
Observations: 128   
R-squared 0.265344     Mean dependent var 0.031456 
Adjusted R-squared 0.241452     S.D. dependent var 1.299786 
S.E. of regression 1.132044     Sum squared resid 157.6273 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.279417    
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Equation: DLEGG = C(24)*DCCINF(-2) + C(25)*DCCINF(-4) + C(26) 
        *DLEGG_TH(-1) + C(27)*DLEGG_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) + 
        [AR(1)=C(28),AR(3)=C(29),BACKCAST=2003M06,ESTSMPL="2003 
        M06 2013M11"]   
Observations: 126   
R-squared 0.164701     Mean dependent var -0.001978 
Adjusted R-squared 0.129897     S.D. dependent var 1.098880 
S.E. of regression 1.025028     Sum squared resid 126.0818 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.145710    
     
Equation: DMARTIN = C(30)*DCCINF(-2) + C(31)*DCCINF(-3) + C(32) 
        *DMARTIN_TH(-1) + C(33)*DMARTIN_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) + 
        [AR(1)=C(34),AR(2)=C(35),BACKCAST=2003M05,ESTSMPL="2003 
        M05 2013M11"]   
Observations: 127   
R-squared 0.278637     Mean dependent var 0.027263 
Adjusted R-squared 0.248829     S.D. dependent var 1.088558 
S.E. of regression 0.943454     Sum squared resid 107.7028 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.145455    
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Table 10.5: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results (Indonesia) 
 
System: SUR   
Estimation Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Iterate coefficients after one-step weighting matrix 
Convergence achieved after: 1 weight matrix, 14 total coef iterations 
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
DABERDEEN_TH(-1) -0.113 0.070 -1.613 0.107 
DABERDEEN_TH(-
1)*DCCINF(-1) -0.132 0.057 -2.326 0.020 
AR(1) -0.977 0.087 -11.192 0.000 
AR(2) -0.737 0.112 -6.569 0.000 
AR(3) -0.542 0.109 -4.972 0.000 
AR(4) -0.238 0.077 -3.113 0.002 
DCCINF(-1) -0.097 0.217 -0.447 0.655 
DACADIAN_TH(-1) 0.017 0.086 0.199 0.843 
DACADIAN_TH(-
1)*DCCINF(-1) -0.096 0.157 -0.610 0.542 
AR(1) -0.543 0.080 -6.756 0.000 
AR(15) -0.117 0.068 -1.708 0.088 
AR(16) -0.151 0.068 -2.210 0.028 
DCCINF(-10) -0.286 0.288 -0.995 0.320 
DCCINF(-3) 0.266 0.291 0.913 0.362 
DBAILLIE_TH(-1) -0.139 0.151 -0.917 0.360 
DBAILLIE_TH(-
1)*DCCINF(-1) -0.001 0.210 -0.004 0.997 
AR(1) -0.530 0.101 -5.253 0.000 
AR(15) -0.085 0.090 -0.941 0.347 
DCCINF(-20) 1.257 0.388 3.239 0.001 
DCCINF(-1) 1.040 0.452 2.300 0.022 
DGENESIS_TH(-1) 0.373 0.142 2.632 0.009 
DGENESIS_TH(-
1)*DCCINF(-1) 0.316 0.166 1.897 0.058 
AR(29) 0.153 0.107 1.426 0.155 
DCCINF(-6) -0.614 0.195 -3.139 0.002 
DLEGG_TH(-1) 0.038 0.089 0.426 0.670 
DLEGG_TH(-
1)*DCCINF(-1) -0.113 0.110 -1.024 0.306 
DCCINF(-4) 0.411 0.199 2.064 0.040 
AR(2) -0.516 0.106 -4.879 0.000 
 117 
AR(1) -0.744 0.090 -8.244 0.000 
AR(3) -0.364 0.102 -3.552 0.000 
AR(4) -0.298 0.086 -3.458 0.001 
DCCINF(-1) 0.241 0.191 1.260 0.208 
DCCINF(-12) -0.005 0.175 -0.028 0.978 
DMARTIN_TH(-1) -0.061 0.103 -0.597 0.551 
DMARTIN_TH(-
1)*DCCINF(-1) -0.171 0.306 -0.559 0.577 
AR(2) -0.505 0.122 -4.122 0.000 
AR(1) -0.848 0.096 -8.840 0.000 
AR(3) -0.221 0.099 -2.240 0.026 
     
     Determinant residual covariance 1738.247   
     
          
Equation: DABERDEEN = C(1)*DABERDEEN_TH(-1) + C(2) 
        *DABERDEEN_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) + [AR(1)=C(3),AR(2)=C(4),AR(3) 
        =C(5),AR(4)=C(6)]  
Observations: 106   
R-squared 0.550008     Mean dependent var 0.003178 
Adjusted R-squared 0.527508     S.D. dependent var 2.303323 
S.E. of regression 1.583259     Sum squared resid 250.6710 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.004483    
     
Equation: DACADIAN = C(7)*DCCINF(-1) + C(8)*DACADIAN_TH(-1) + 
        C(9)*DACADIAN_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) + [AR(1)=C(10),AR(15)=C(11), 
        AR(16)=C(12),BACKCAST=2005M09,ESTSMPL="2005M09 
        2013M12"]   
Observations: 100   
R-squared 0.318472     Mean dependent var -0.003251 
Adjusted R-squared 0.282220     S.D. dependent var 2.281242 
S.E. of regression 1.932711     Sum squared resid 351.1250 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.162842    
     
Equation: DBAILLIE = C(13)*DCCINF(-10) + C(14)*DCCINF(-3) + C(15) 
        *DBAILLIE_TH(-1) + C(16)*DBAILLIE_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) + 
        [AR(1)=C(17),AR(15)=C(18),BACKCAST=2006M05,ESTSMPL="200 
        6M05 2011M08"]  
Observations: 64   
R-squared 0.333271     Mean dependent var 0.021864 
Adjusted R-squared 0.275794     S.D. dependent var 2.596137 
S.E. of regression 2.209320     Sum squared resid 283.1034 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.343969    
     
Equation: DGENESIS = C(19)*DCCINF(-20) + C(20)*DCCINF(-1) + C(21) 
        *DGENESIS_TH(-1) + C(22)*DGENESIS_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) + 
        [AR(29)=C(23),BACKCAST=2008M05,ESTSMPL="2008M05 
        2013M12"]   
Observations: 68   
R-squared 0.233842     Mean dependent var -0.018903 
Adjusted R-squared 0.185197     S.D. dependent var 2.886045 
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S.E. of regression 2.605129     Sum squared resid 427.5620 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.396326    
     
Equation: DLEGG = C(24)*DCCINF(-6) + C(25)*DLEGG_TH(-1) + C(26) 
        *DLEGG_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) + C(27)*DCCINF(-4) + [AR(2)=C(28),A 
        R(1)=C(29),AR(3)=C(30),AR(4)=C(31)] 
Observations: 107   
R-squared 0.478760     Mean dependent var 0.016251 
Adjusted R-squared 0.441905     S.D. dependent var 2.573850 
S.E. of regression 1.922815     Sum squared resid 366.0244 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.027184    
     
Equation: DMARTIN = C(32)*DCCINF(-1) + C(33)*DCCINF(-12) + C(34) 
        *DMARTIN_TH(-1) + C(35)*DMARTIN_TH(-1)*DCCINF(-1) + 
        [AR(2)=C(36),AR(1)=C(37),AR(3)=C(38),BACKCAST=2005M07,EST 
        SMPL="2005M07 2013M12"]  
Observations: 102   
R-squared 0.453928     Mean dependent var -0.002080 
Adjusted R-squared 0.419439     S.D. dependent var 2.329817 
S.E. of regression 1.775194     Sum squared resid 299.3749 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.119001    
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Table 10.6: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results (Thailand) 
 
System: SUR   
Estimation Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Total system (unbalanced) observations 720 
Iterate coefficients after one-step weighting matrix 
Convergence achieved after: 1 weight matrix, 18 total coef iterations 
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
DCCINF(-1) -0.056 0.167 -0.335 0.738 
DCCINF(-5) -0.389 0.178 -2.183 0.029 
DCCINF(-3) 0.433 0.194 2.228 0.026 
DCCINF(-2) -0.464 0.185 -2.508 0.012 
DCCINF(-4) 0.455 0.191 2.385 0.017 
DCCINF(-6) 0.093 0.150 0.619 0.536 
AR(1) -0.540 0.082 -6.578 0.000 
AR(3) -0.447 0.101 -4.425 0.000 
AR(4) -0.401 0.104 -3.871 0.000 
AR(2) -0.601 0.092 -6.542 0.000 
AR(5) -0.445 0.101 -4.385 0.000 
AR(6) -0.384 0.093 -4.136 0.000 
AR(7) -0.461 0.083 -5.545 0.000 
DCCINF(-3) 0.671 0.197 3.408 0.001 
DCCINF(-1) -0.243 0.160 -1.515 0.130 
DCCINF(-4) -0.433 0.186 -2.328 0.020 
AR(3) -0.304 0.083 -3.651 0.000 
AR(1) -0.577 0.083 -6.936 0.000 
AR(2) -0.332 0.095 -3.514 0.001 
DCCINF(-1) 0.141 0.127 1.109 0.268 
DCCINF(-12) 0.088 0.119 0.744 0.457 
DCCINF(-9) 0.021 0.128 0.161 0.872 
AR(1) -0.463 0.096 -4.821 0.000 
AR(2) -0.419 0.100 -4.181 0.000 
AR(3) -0.370 0.103 -3.588 0.000 
AR(4) -0.418 0.104 -4.029 0.000 
AR(5) -0.327 0.099 -3.310 0.001 
AR(6) -0.132 0.093 -1.418 0.157 
DCCINF(-3) 0.186 0.185 1.003 0.316 
DCCINF(-5) 0.032 0.148 0.217 0.828 
 120 
DCCINF(-1) -0.003 0.174 -0.017 0.987 
AR(1) -0.598 0.086 -6.970 0.000 
AR(2) -0.505 0.097 -5.187 0.000 
AR(3) -0.482 0.102 -4.715 0.000 
AR(4) -0.309 0.101 -3.059 0.002 
AR(5) -0.294 0.098 -3.012 0.003 
AR(6) -0.162 0.087 -1.864 0.063 
DCCINF(-1) 0.295 0.173 1.708 0.088 
DCCINF(-4) 0.107 0.138 0.775 0.439 
DCCINF(-2) -0.244 0.178 -1.370 0.171 
AR(3) -0.247 0.088 -2.803 0.005 
AR(1) -0.580 0.083 -6.944 0.000 
AR(2) -0.486 0.092 -5.290 0.000 
DCCINF(-4) 0.376 0.181 2.079 0.038 
DCCINF(-1) 0.369 0.182 2.029 0.043 
AR(2) -0.315 0.177 -1.782 0.075 
     
     Determinant residual covariance 379.4267   
     
          
Equation: DABERDEEN = C(1)*DCCINF(-1) + C(2)*DCCINF(-5) + C(3) 
        *DCCINF(-3) + C(4)*DCCINF(-2) + C(5)*DCCINF(-4) + C(6) 
        *DCCINF(-6) + [AR(1)=C(7),AR(3)=C(8),AR(4)=C(9),AR(2)=C(10),A 
        R(5)=C(11),AR(6)=C(12),AR(7)=C(13)] 
Observations: 117   
R-squared 0.394082     Mean dependent var 0.038462 
Adjusted R-squared 0.324168     S.D. dependent var 1.943517 
S.E. of regression 1.597746     Sum squared resid 265.4903 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.764205    
     
Equation: DACADIAN = C(14)*DCCINF(-3) + C(15)*DCCINF(-1) + C(16) 
        *DCCINF(-4) + [AR(3)=C(17),AR(1)=C(18),AR(2)=C(19)] 
Observations: 123   
R-squared 0.380023     Mean dependent var 0.050407 
Adjusted R-squared 0.353528     S.D. dependent var 2.468939 
S.E. of regression 1.985112     Sum squared resid 461.0586 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.055446    
     
Equation: DBAILLIE = C(20)*DCCINF(-1) + C(21)*DCCINF(-12) + C(22) 
        *DCCINF(-9) + [AR(1)=C(23),AR(2)=C(24),AR(3)=C(25),AR(4)=C(26 
        ),AR(5)=C(27),AR(6)=C(28)] 
Observations: 112   
R-squared 0.239619     Mean dependent var 0.033571 
Adjusted R-squared 0.180561     S.D. dependent var 1.653283 
S.E. of regression 1.496599     Sum squared resid 230.7004 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.933250    
     
Equation: DGENESIS = C(29)*DCCINF(-3) + C(30)*DCCINF(-5) + C(31) 
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        *DCCINF(-1) + [AR(1)=C(32),AR(2)=C(33),AR(3)=C(34),AR(4)=C(35 
        ),AR(5)=C(36),AR(6)=C(37)] 
Observations: 119   
R-squared 0.277179     Mean dependent var -0.001597 
Adjusted R-squared 0.224610     S.D. dependent var 2.092608 
S.E. of regression 1.842672     Sum squared resid 373.4983 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.994103    
     
Equation: DLEGG = C(38)*DCCINF(-1) + C(39)*DCCINF(-4) + C(40) 
        *DCCINF(-1) + [AR(3)=C(41),AR(1)=C(42),AR(2)=C(43),BACKCAST 
        =2003M09,ESTSMPL="2003M09 2013M11"] 
Observations: 123   
R-squared 0.339003     Mean dependent var 0.068293 
Adjusted R-squared 0.310756     S.D. dependent var 2.199484 
S.E. of regression 1.826028     Sum squared resid 390.1222 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.056223    
     
Equation: DMARTIN = C(44)*DCCINF(-4) + C(45)*DCCINF(-1) + 
[AR(2)=C(46)] 
           
Observations: 126   
R-squared 0.078575     Mean dependent var 0.038571 
Adjusted R-squared 0.063592     S.D. dependent var 1.863687 
S.E. of regression 1.803456     Sum squared resid 400.0518 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.801980    
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